categoryMenu_new
 
  Home
  EXTRAORDINARY AH Teaching from Spiritual Hierarchy
  AbundantHope
  NEW READERS! Read Here First
  Supporting AH
  Leadership of AbundantHope
  Announcements
  Regional AH Sites
  Other Sites with AH material
  Contact Us
  Becoming A Messiah
  OUR PUBLIC FORUM IS OPEN TOO ALL
  Mission Ideas
  System Busting
  Cleric Letter/English
  Translations of Cleric Letter
  AH Member Writings
  Candace
  Ron
  Rosie
  Jess
  Brian's Poetry
  James
  Giuseppe
  Esteban
  Telepathic Messages
  Candace
  Jess Anthony
  Vince
  Leonette
  John
  Adam
  Bela
  Joyce
  Hazel
  Kibo
  Peter
  Rosie
  Johan
  Lucia
  Lucia G
  Rubens
  Shellee-Kim
  Ben
  Dorothea
  Solon
  Others
  Targeted Messages
  Hano
  Light Flower
  Changing The Face Of Religion
  - Phoenix Journals - PDF in German
  Candace on Religion
  Other Spiritual Pieces
  Spiritual Nuggets by the Masters
  Phoenix Journals
  Phoenix Journals - PDF
  Telepathic Messages PDF books
  Selections from the Urantia Book
  Illustrations For The Urantia Book
  CMGSN Pieces
  THE WAVE
  Environment/Science
  David Crayford and the ITC
  Health and Nutrition
  Podcasts, Radio Shows, Video by AH
  Political Information
  True US History
  Human/Animal Rights
  The Miracle That Is Me
  Education
  Resources
  911 Material
  Books - eBooks
  government email/phone #'s
  Self Reliance
  Video
  Websites
  Alternative News Sources
  Art and Music
  Foreign Sites
  Health and Healing
  Human/Animal Rights
  Scientific
  Spiritual
  Vegan Recipes
  Translated Material
  Dutch
  Gekanaliseerde berichten Jess
  Gekanaliseerde berichten Candace
  Gekanaliseerde berichten Anderen
  Artikelen/berichten
  French
  Canal Jess
  Par Candace
  Other Channels
  Articles
  German
  Telepathische Nachrichten (Candace)
  Telepathische Nachrichten (Jess)
  Telepathische Nachrichten (div.)
  AH Mitgliederbeiträge (Candace)
  AH Mitgliederbeiträge (Jess)
  Spirituelle Schätze
  Italian
  Translations - Candace
  Translations - Jess
  Translations - Others
  Portuguese
  by Candace
  By Jess
  By Others
  Spanish
  Anfitriones Divinos
  Bitácoras Fénix
  Creadores-de-Alas (WingMakers/Lyricus)
  Escritos de Candace
  Escritos de Otros
  Monjoronsón
  Telemensajes de Candace
  Telemensajes de Jess Anthony
  Telemensajes de Otros
  Chinese
  By Candace
  By Jess
  By Others
  Korean Translations
  Hungarian Translations
  Swedish Translations

Search
[an error occurred while processing this directive]
Political Information : True US History Last Updated: Dec 29, 2018 - 7:37:51 PM


Supreme Court of the US: Decision in BOND v US Reinstates Individual & State Sovereignty Rights
By Supreme Court of US with comments by Ron
Jul 31, 2011 - 5:36:05 PM

Email this article
 Printer friendly page Share/Bookmark

Supreme Court of the US: Decision in BOND v US Reinstates Individual & State Sovereignty Rights

Ron: The effects of The WAVE are truly wonderous to behold. In the case of Carol Anne Bond vs. United States, No. 09–1227, 564 U. S. ... (June 16, 2011) the Full Court (9 Judges) of the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) agreed virtually unanimously that:

"Federalism secures the freedom of the individual. It allows States to respond, through the enactment of positive law, to the initiative of those who seek a voice in shaping the destiny of their own times without having to rely solely upon the political processes that control a remote central power…the individual liberty secured by federalism is not simply derivative of the rights of the States…to the States. States are not the sole intended beneficiaries of federalism.…

"Federalism also protects the liberty of all persons within a State by ensuring that laws enacted in excess of delegated governmental power cannot direct or control their actions. See ibid. By denying any one government complete jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of the individual from arbitrary power. When government acts in excess of its lawful powers, that liberty is at stake…

"An individual has a direct interest in objecting to laws that upset the constitutional balance between the National Government and the States whenthe enforcement of those laws causes injury that is concrete, particular, and redressable. Fidelity to principles of federalism is not for the States alone to vindicate…

"Impermissible interference with state sovereignty is not within the enumerated powers of the National Government, see New York, 505 U. S., at 155–159, and action that exceeds the National Government’s enumerated powers undermines the sovereign interests of States. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 564 (1995)…

"Bond, like any other defendant, has a personal right not to be convicted under a constitutionally invalid law…See also North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 739 (1969) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ('Due process . . . is a guarantee that a man should be tried and convicted only in accordance with valid laws of the land.')

“An offense created by [an unconstitutional law],” the Court has held, “is not a crime.” Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 376 (1880). “A conviction under [such a law] is not merely erroneous, but is illegal and void, and cannot be a legal cause of imprisonment.” Id., at 376–377. If a law is invalid as applied to the criminal defendant’s conduct, the defendant is entitled to go free.

"…a court has no “prudential” license to decline to consider whether the statute under which the defendant has been charged lacks constitutional application to her conduct. And that is so even where the constitutional provision that would render the conviction void is directed at protecting a party not before the Court…(reversal required even if, going forward, Congress would cure the unequal treatment by extending rather than invalidating the criminal proscription).

"In short, a law 'beyond the power of Congress,' for any reason, is 'no law at all.' Nigro v. United States, 276 U. S. 332, 341 (1928)..."

Comments:

The decision in Bond's case opens up the possibility of very extensive judicial review and rejection by SCOTUS, of much US legislation. SCOTUS's power to judicially review and where appropriate, strike down invalid legislation was recognised in Hylton v US (3 U.S. 171 (1796) and Marbury vs. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). That power has been exercised ever since. However, such review will need to be initiated on a case by case basis by litigants. Judicial review in accordance with the decision in Bond v US could cut down the powers of the US federal government enormously and totally change the US political, social and economic landscape. So be it.

The essence of civil liberty consists in the right of every individual to claim and obtain the protection of the common law and valid laws made in accordance with divine principles  whenever sovereign rights are infringed or an injury is received. The decision in Bond's case generally reestablishes that possibility for the first time in recent US history. Although protecting citizens rights is a primary responsibility of any form of governance it is a duty that has been increasingly honoured in the breach rather than the observance in recent US history.

According to the jurisprudence following Marbury vs. Madison, when SCOTUS measures a law against the Constitution and finds the law wanting, it is empowered and indeed obligated to strike down that law. In this role, for example, the Court has struck down state laws for failing to conform to the Contract Clause (see, e.g., Dartmouth College v. Woodward) or the Equal Protection Clause (see, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education), and it has invalidated federal laws for failing to arise under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution (see, e.g., United States v. Lopez). But arguably the rights of citizens have been increasingly ignored and eroded, especially since the US Corporation went bankrupt in 1933 and secured finance from international bankers using US citizens and their property as collateral. Those secret contracts and the adhesion contracts used ever since that time to use US employees and citizens as loan collateral were fraudulent and unlawful but the courts have widely ignored the fraud involved. That situation should now change as those seeking to have US income tax legislation declared invalid use the decision in Bond v US to establish their case in the courts. An incidental effect will be that the IRS will be declared unlawful as will the Congress' authorisation of the Federal Reserve System (The Fed) and the funny fiat money creation, borrowing and usury arrangements agreed between Congress and the private bankers who own the Fed.

Valid law cannot coexist with deliberate falsehood or fraud. Lord Denning observed in unequivocal language that ' no judgment of a Court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud, for, fraud unravels everything.' ( (Lazarus Estate Ltd. Vs. Beasley 1956(1) QB 702.). In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Rajendra Singh & Ors. AIR 2000 SC 1165, SCOTUS observed that “Fraud and justice never dwell together” (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant) and that  maxim will surely we wheeled out again to invalidate a whole raft of unlawful and fraudulent Congressional legislation and associated practices and mechanisms, once USans get to understand the import of the ruling in Bond's case.

Why will US legislation and mechanisms like the IRS now be eliminated by appropriate legal proceedings by USans? Because Bond's case reinforces the view that:

A law repugnant to the Constitution is void. An act of Congress repugnant to the Constitution cannot become a law. The Constitution supersedes all other laws and the individual’s rights shall be liberally enforced in favor of him, the clearly intended and expressly designated beneficiary.

The Federal Reserve System legislation is repugnant to the Constitution and is therefore NOT valid law. DITTO the US legislative provisions imposing income taxes on citizens other than genuine Federal Government employees. And so on.

As regards IRS assessments, now that USans sovereignty rights have been acknowledged by SCOTUS, its decision in Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886) SCOTUS is relevant. In that case the Court  said:

"An unconstitutional act [of assessment] is not a law [or a lawful act]; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed [or executed]." [Norton v. Shelby County, 118 US 425 (1885)].

Sooo, the IRS, the Fed and their ilk, must go.

Similarly, in Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) SCOTUS said:

“Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule-making or legislation which would abrogate them.”

Arguably the problem USans have increasingly faced, at least since the American Civil War, is that SCOTUS has not adhered to its own valid rulings and dictums. NOW, USans must hold the US federal judiciary's' "feet to the fire", to enforce the ramifications of the ruling in Bond's case.

The true situation is that:

“No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law, and no courts are bound or lawfully able to enforce it. The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute, whether federal or state, though having the form and name of law, is in reality no law, but is wholly void and ineffective for any purpose, since unconstitutionality dates from the time of its enactment, and not merely from the date of the decision so branding it. An unconstitutional law, in legal contemplation, is as inoperative as if it had never been passed.”(16 American Jurisprudence 2d, Sec. 256). Much such legislation has been as is being unlawfully enforced in the US under "colour of law", that is, legislation that is both unlawful and illegal.

Link to PDF SC Ruling: Supreme Court: REINSTATED SOVEREIGNTY PDF: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-1227.pdf

*************

9th WAVE - GROUNDBREAKING US SUPREME COURT RULING

Thanks to for this 14' 45" video uploaded on Jul 25, 2011: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FuPo335Wp5Q&feature=player_embedded

Uploader's comments:

On June 16, 2011, the US Supreme Court overturned a US Court of Appeal ruling; and, believe it or not, reasserted not only State sovereignty but individual sovereignty as well. And we thought the government was going to hell in a hand basket! This unanimous decision, as I see it, is a major turning point, a visible shift in consciousness of the ruling elite. All things are possible. Watch for miraculous reversals in the remainder of this 9th wave.

 

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-1227.pdf

A copy of the decision is below. Colour font, bolding and underlining added:

09 – 1227 PDF

1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2010

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as isbeing done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has beenprepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BOND v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 09–1227. Argued February 22, 2011—Decided June 16, 2011

When petitioner Bond discovered that her close friend was pregnant byBond’s husband, she began harassing the woman. The woman suffered a minor burn after Bond put caustic substances on objects the woman was likely to touch. Bond was indicted for violating 18

U. S. C. §229, which forbids knowing possession or use, for nonpeaceful purposes, of a chemical that “can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans,” §§229(a); 229F(1); (7); (8), and which is part of a federal Act implementing a chemical weapons treaty ratified by the United States. The District Court denied Bond’s motion to dismiss the §229 charges on the ground that thestatute exceeded Congress’ constitutional authority to enact. She entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the ruling on the statute’s validity. She did just that, renewing her Tenth Amendment claim. The Third Circuit, however, accepted the Government’s position that she lacked standing. The Government has since changed its view on Bond’s standing.

Held: Bond has standing to challenge the federal statute on grounds that the measure interferes with the powers reserved to States. Pp. 3–14.

(a) The Third Circuit relied on a single sentence in Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U. S. 118. Pp. 3–8.

(1) The Court has disapproved of Tennessee Electric as authoritative for purposes of Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement. See Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 152–154. Here, Article III’s standing requirement had no bearing on Bond’s capacity to assert defenses in the District Court.And Article III’s prerequisites are met with regard to her standing toappeal. Pp. 3–5.

(1) Federalism has more than one dynamic. In allocating powersbetween the States and National Government, federalism “ ‘secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power,’ ” New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144, 181. It enables States to enact positive law in response to the initiative of those whoseek a voice in shaping the destiny of their own times, and it protects the liberty of all persons within a State by ensuring that law enactedin excess of delegated governmental power cannot direct or control their actions. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 458. Federalism’s limitations are not therefore a matter of rights belonging only to the States. In a proper case, a litigant may challenge a law as enacted in contravention of federalism, just as injured individuals maychallenge actions that transgress, e.g., separation-of-powers limitations, see, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919. The claim need not depend on the vicarious assertion of a State’s constitutional interests,even if those interests are also implicated. Pp. 8–12.

(2) The Government errs in contending that Bond should bepermitted to assert only that Congress could not enact the challenged statute under its enumerated powers but that standing should be denied if she argues that the statute interferes with state sovereignty. Here, Bond asserts that the public policy of the Pennsylvania, enacted in its capacity as sovereign, has been displaced by that of theNational Government. The law to which she is subject, the prosecution she seeks to counter, and the punishment she must face might not have come about had the matter been left for Pennsylvania to decide. There is no support for the Government’s proposed distinctionbetween different federalism arguments for purposes of prudentialstanding rules. The principles of limited national powers and statesovereignty are intertwined. Impermissible interference with state sovereignty is not within the National Government’s enumeratedpowers, and action exceeding the National Government’s enumeratedpowers undermines the States’ sovereign interests. Individuals seeking to challenge such measures are subject to Article III and prudential standing rules applicable to all litigants and claims, but here,where the litigant is a party to an otherwise justiciable case or controversy, she is not forbidden to object that her injury results from disregard of the federal structure of the Government. Pp. 12–14.

(c) The Court expresses no view on the merits of Bond’s challenge

to the statute’s validity. P. 14. 581 F. 3d 128, reversed and remanded.

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. GINS-BURG, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BREYER, J.,

_________________ _________________ 1 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication inthe preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requestedto notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States,Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 09–1227

CAROL ANNE BOND, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[June 16, 2011]

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether a person indicted for violating a federal statute has standing to challenge its validity on grounds that, by enacting it, Congress exceeded its powers under the Constitution, thus intruding upon the sovereignty and authority of the States.

The indicted defendant, petitioner here, sought to argue the invalidity of the statute. She relied on the Tenth Amendment, and, by extension, on the premise that Congress exceeded its powers by enacting it in contravention of basic federalism principles. The statute, 18 U. S. C. §229, was enacted to comply with a treaty; but petitioner contends that, at least in the present instance, the treaty cannot be the source of congressional power to regulate or prohibit her conduct.

The Court of Appeals held that because a State was not a party to the federal criminal proceeding, petitioner had no standing to challenge the statute as an infringement upon the powers reserved to the States. Having concluded that petitioner does have standing to challenge the federal statute on these grounds, this Court now reverses that determination. The merits of petitioner’s challenge to the statute’s validity are to be considered, in the first instance, by the Court of Appeals on remand and are not addressed in this opinion.

I This case arises from a bitter personal dispute, leading to the criminal acts charged here. Petitioner Carol Anne Bond lived outside Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. After discovering that her close friend was pregnant and that the father was Bond’s husband, Bond sought revenge. Bond subjected the woman to a campaign of harassing telephone calls and letters, acts that resulted in a criminal conviction on a minor state charge. Bond persisted in her hostile acts, placing caustic substances on objects the woman was likely to touch, including her mailbox, car door handle, and front door knob. Bond’s victim suffered a minor burn on her hand and contacted federal investigators, who identified Bond as the perpetrator. Bond was indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for, among other offenses, two counts of violating §229. Section 229 forbids knowing possession or use of any chemical that “can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals” where not intended for a “peaceful purpose.” §§229(a); 229F(1); (7); (8). The statute was enacted as part of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, 112 Stat. 2681–856, 22 U. S. C. §6701 et seq.; 18 U. S. C. §229 et seq. The Act implements provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, a treaty the United States ratified in 1997.

In the District Court, Bond moved to dismiss the §229 charges, contending the statute was beyond Congress’ constitutional authority to enact. The District Court denied the motion. Bond entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving the right to appeal the ruling on the validity of the statute. She was sentenced to six years in prison.

In the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Bond renewed her challenge to the statute, citing, among other authorities, the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. The Court of Appeals asked for supplemental briefs on the question whether Bond had standing to raise the Tenth Amendment as a ground for invalidating a federal statute in the absence of a State’s participation in the proceedings.

In its supplemental brief in the Court of Appeals, the Government took the position that Bond did not have standing. The Court of Appeals agreed. 581 F. 3d 128 (2009).

When Bond sought certiorari, the Government advised this Court that it had changed its position and that, in its view, Bond does have standing to challenge the constitutionality of §229 on Tenth Amendment grounds. See Brief for United States (filed July 9, 2010). The Court granted certiorari, 562 U. S. ___ (2010), and appointed an amicus curiae to defend the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Stephen McAllister, a member of the bar of this Court, filed an amicus brief and presented an oral argument that have been of considerable assistance to the Court.

II To conclude that petitioner lacks standing to challenge a federal statute on grounds that the measure interferes with the powers reserved to States, the Court of Appeals relied on a single sentence from this Court’s opinion in Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U. S. 118 (1939). See 581 F. 3d, at 136–138. As the Court of Appeals noted here, other Courts of Appeals have taken a similar approach. E.g., United States v. Hacker, 565 F.3d 522, 525– 527 (CA8 2009); Oregon v. Legal Servs. Corp., 552 F. 3d 965, 971–972 (CA9 2009); Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 462 F. 3d 219, 234–235 (CA2 2006); Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F. 3d 25, 33–36 (CA1 2005); United States v. Parker, 362 F. 3d 1279, 1284–1285 (CA10 2004). That approach is in tension, if not conflict, with decisions of some other Courts of Appeals. See Gillespie v. Indianapolis, 185 F. 3d 693, 700–704 (CA7 1999); Metrolina Family Practice Group, P. A. v. Sullivan, 767 F. Supp.1314 (WDNC 1989), aff’d 929 F. 2d 693 (CA4 1991); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. United States Dept. of Energy, 666 F. 2d 1359, 1368, n. 16 (CA11 1982); see also United States

v. Johnson, 632 F. 3d 912, 918–921 (CA5 2011) (reserving issue); Lomont v. O’Neill, 285 F. 3d 9, 14, n. 5 (CADC 2002) (same); Nance v. EPA, 645 F. 2d 701, 716 (CA9 1981) (same). Tennessee Electric is the appropriate place to begin.

It should be clear that Tennessee Electric does not cast doubt on Bond’s standing for purposes of Article III’s case-or controversy requirement. This Court long ago disapproved of the case as authoritative respecting Article III limitations. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 152–154 (1970). In the instant case, moreover, it is apparent—and in fact conceded not only by the Government but also by amicus—that Article III poses no barrier. One who seeks to initiate or continue proceedings in federal court must demonstrate, among other requirements, both standing too btain the relief requested, see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–561 (1992), and, in addition, an “ongoing interest in the dispute” on the part of the opposing party that is sufficient to establish “concrete adverseness.” Camreta v. Greene, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 5) (internal quotation marks omitted). When those conditions are met, Article III does not restrict the opposing party’s ability to object to relief being sought at its expense. The requirement of Article III standing thus had no bearing upon Bond’s capacity to assert defenses in the District Court. As for Bond’s standing to appeal, it is clear Article III’s prerequisites are met. Bond’s challenge to her conviction and sentence “satisfies the case-or controversy requirement, because the incarceration . . . constitutes a concrete injury, caused by the conviction and redressable by invalidation of the conviction.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U. S. 1, 7 (1998).

To resolve the case, this Court must consider next whether Tennessee Electric is irrelevant with respect to prudential rules of standing as well. The question in Tennessee Electric was whether a group of private power companies could bring suit to enjoin the federally chartered Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) from producing and selling electric power. It was conceded that competition from the TVA would “inflict substantial damage” upon the power companies. 306 U. S., at 137. According to the companies, the federal statute authorizing the creation and operation of the TVA was invalid because, among other reasons, it exceeded the powers of the National Government in violation of the Tenth Amendment.

Declining to reach the merits, the Court concluded the power companies’ lawsuit should be dismissed. It explained that the suit was premised on the principle that a person threatened with injury by conduct “which, but for statutory authority for its performance, would be a violation of his legal rights” could request an injunction from a court of equity and by this means test the validity of the statute. Ibid. But the Court concluded that the TVA, even if it were shorn of congressional statutory authority, had done nothing more than compete as a supplier of electricity. Id., at 138. And since state law did not purport to grant any of the power companies a monopoly, there was no basis for a suit in which the TVA might be forced to invoke its congressional authorization. Id., at 138–143.

In that part of its analysis, and throughout its opinion, the Tennessee Electric Court stated that the problem with the power companies’ suit was a lack of “standing” or a “cause of action.” It treated those concepts as interchangeable. E.g., id., at 139 (no “standing” because no “legal cause of complaint”); id., at 139–140 (no “standing” without “a cause of action or a right to sue”); id., at 142 (“no standing,” no “right to sue for an injunction”); id., at 144 (no Tenth Amendment “standing” and no Ninth Amendment “cause of action” for same reasons); see also Bellia, Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 777, 826–830 (2004).

Even though decisions since Tennessee Electric have been careful to use the terms “cause of action” and “standing” with more precision, the distinct concepts can be difficult to keep separate. If, for instance, the person alleging injury is remote from the zone of interests a statute protects, whether there is a legal injury at all and whether the particular litigant is one who may assert it can involve similar inquiries. Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 96–97, and n. 2 (1998) (noting that statutory standing and the existence of a cause of action are “closely connected” and “sometimes identical” questions).

Still, the question whether a plaintiff states a claim for relief “goes to the merits” in the typical case, not the justiciability of a dispute, id., at 92, and conflation of the two concepts can cause confusion. This is the case with the Tenth Amendment discussion in Tennessee Electric. The Tennessee Electric Court noted that “[a] distinct ground upon which standing to maintain the suit is said to rest is that the acts of the Authority cannot be upheld without permitting federal regulation of purely local matters reserved to the states or the people by the Tenth Amendment.” 306 U. S., at 143. The Court rejected the argument, however, concluding the Tenth Amendment did not give one business a right to keep another from competing. Id., at 144. (“The sale of government property in competition with others is not a violation of the Tenth Amendment”).

The Court then added the sentence upon which the Court of Appeals relied in the instant case, the sentence that has been the source of disagreement among Courts of Appeals:

“As we have seen there is no objection to the Authority’s operations by the states, and, if this were not so, the appellants, absent the states or their officers, have no standing in this suit to raise any question under the amendment.” Ibid.

The quoted statement was in the context of a decision which held that business competitors had no legal injury, and the word standing can be interpreted in that sense. On this reading, the statement reiterated an earlier point. The statement explained that the States in which the TVA operated exempted it from their public utilities regulations; and that even if the States had not done so and the TVA had violated those regulations, the regulations were for the States to enforce. See id., at 141–142. They conferred no private right of action on business competitors. This reading is consistent with the Tennessee Electric Court’s use of the term “standing” elsewhere in its opinion to refer to the existence of a state-law cause of action. A holding that state utilities regulations did not supply a cause of action against a competitor is of no relevance to the instant case, and we need not explore all of its implications. See also Data Processing, 397 U. S., at 157–158 (cause of action under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5

U. S. C. §702, permits suit based on injury from business competition).

Yet the quoted statement also could be read to refer to standing in the sense of whether the power companies were the proper litigants to raise a Tenth Amendment issue. To the extent that might have been the intention of the Tennessee Electric Court, it is, for reasons to be explained, inconsistent with our later precedents. The sentence from Tennessee Electric that we have quoted and discussed should be deemed neither controlling nor instructive on the issue of standing as that term is nowdefined and applied.

III Amicus contends that federal courts should not adjudicate a claim like Bond’s because of the prudential rule that a party “generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 499, 500 (1975); see also Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U. S. 125, 129–130 (2004). In amicus’ view, to argue that the National Government has interfered with state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment is to assert the legal rights and interests of States and States alone. That, however, is not so. As explained below, Bond seeks to vindicate her own constitutional interests. The individual, in a proper case, can assert injury from governmental action taken in excess of the authority that federalism defines. Her rights in this regard do not belong to a State.

A The federal system rests on what might at first seem a counter intuitive insight, that “freedom is enhanced by the creation of two governments, not one.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 758 (1999). The Framers concluded that allocation of powers between the National Government and the States enhances freedom, first by protecting the integrity of the governments themselves, and second by protecting the people, from whom all governmental powers are derived.

Federalism has more than one dynamic. It is true that the federal structure serves to grant and delimit the prerogatives and responsibilities of the States and the National Government vis-à-vis one another. The allocation of powers in our federal system preserves the integrity, dignity, and residual sovereignty of the States. The federal balance is, in part, an end in itself, to ensure that States function as political entities in their own right.

But that is not its exclusive sphere of operation. Federalism is more than an exercise in setting the boundary between different institutions of government for their own integrity. “State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: ‘Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.’” New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144, 181 (1992) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).

Some of these liberties are of a political character. The federal structure allows local policies “more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society,” permits “innovation and experimentation,” enables greater citizen “involvement in democratic processes,” and makes government “more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 458 (1991). Federalism secures the freedom of the individual. It allows States to respond, through the enactment of positive law, to the initiative of those who seek a voice in shaping the destiny of their own times without having to rely solely upon the political processes that control a remote central power. True, of course, these objects cannot be vindicated by the Judiciary in the absence of a proper case or controversy; but the individual liberty secured by federalism is not simply derivative of the rights of the States.

Federalism also protects the liberty of all persons within a State by ensuring that laws enacted in excess of delegated governmental power cannot direct or control their actions. See ibid. By denying any one government complete jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of the individual from arbitrary power. When government acts in excess of its lawful powers, that liberty is at stake.

The limitations that federalism entails are not therefore a matter of rights belonging only to the States. States are not the sole intended beneficiaries of federalism. See New York, supra, at 181. An individual has a direct interest in objecting to laws that upset the constitutional balance between the National Government and the States when the enforcement of those laws causes injury that is concrete, particular, and redressable. Fidelity to principles of federalism is not for the States alone to vindicate.

The recognition of an injured person’s standing to object to a violation of a constitutional principle that allocates power within government is illustrated, in an analogous context, by cases in which individuals sustain discrete, justiciable injury from actions that transgress separation of-powers limitations. Separation-of-powers principles are intended, in part, to protect each branch of government from incursion by the others. Yet the dynamic between and among the branches is not the only object of the Constitution’s concern. The structural principles secured by the separation of powers protect the individual as well.

In the precedents of this Court, the claims of individuals—not of Government departments—have been the principal source of judicial decisions concerning separation of powers and checks and balances. For example, the requirement that a bill enacted by Congress be presented to the President for signature before it can become law gives the President a check over Congress’ exercise of legislative power. See U. S. Const., Art. I, §7.

Yet individuals, too, are protected by the operations of separation of powers and checks and balances; and they are not disabled from relying on those principles in otherwise justiciable cases and controversies. In INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 (1983), it was an individual who successfully challenged the so-called legislative veto—a procedure that Congress used in an attempt to invalidate an executive determination without presenting the measure to the President. The procedure diminished the role of the Executive, but the challenger sought to protect not the prerogatives of the Presidency as such but rather his own right to avoid deportation under an invalid order. Chadha’s challenge was sustained. A cardinal principle of separation of powers was vindicated at the insistence of an individual, indeed one who was not a citizen of the United States but who still was a person whose liberty was at risk.

Chadha is not unique in this respect. Compare Clinton City of New York, 524 U. S. 417, 433–436 (1998) (injuredparties have standing to challenge Presidential line-itemveto) with Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 829–830 (1997) (Congress Members do not); see also, e.g., Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 S. ___ (2010); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U. S. 211 (1995); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714 (1986); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458

S. 50 (1982); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952); A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935). If the constitutional structure of our Government that protects individual liberty is compromised, individuals who suffer otherwise justiciable injury may object.

Just as it is appropriate for an individual, in a proper case, to invoke separation-of-powers or checks-and balances constraints, so too may a litigant, in a proper case, challenge a law as enacted in contravention of constitutional principles of federalism. That claim need not depend on the vicarious assertion of a State’s constitutional interests, even if a State’s constitutional interests are also implicated.

B In this regard it is necessary to address a misconception in the position the Government now urges this Court to adopt. As noted, the Government agrees that petitioner has standing to challenge the validity of §229. That concession, however, depends on describing petitioner’s claim in a narrow way. The Government contends petitioner asserts only that Congress could not enact the challenged statute under its enumerated powers. Were she to argue, the Government insists, that the statute “interferes with a specific aspect of state sovereignty,” either instead of or in addition to her enumerated powers contention, the Court should deny her standing. Brief for United States 18 (filedDec. 3, 2010).

The premise that petitioner does or should avoid making an “interference-with-sovereignty” argument is flawed. Id., at 33. Here she asserts, for example, that the conduct with which she is charged is “local in nature” and “should be left to local authorities to prosecute” and that congressional regulation of that conduct “signals a massive and unjustifiable expansion of federal law enforcement intostate-regulated domain.” Record in No. 2:07–cr–00528– JG–1 (ED Pa.), Doc. 27, pp. 6, 19. The public policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, enacted in its capacity as sovereign, has been displaced by that of the NationalGovernment. The law to which petitioner is subject, the prosecution she seeks to counter, and the punishment she must face might not have come about if the matter were left for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to decide. Indeed, petitioner argues that under Pennsylvania law the expected maximum term of imprisonment she could have received for the same conduct was barely more than a third of her federal sentence.

There is no basis to support the Government’s proposed distinction between different federalism arguments for purposes of prudential standing rules. The principles of limited national powers and state sovereignty are intertwined. While neither originates in the Tenth Amendment, both are expressed by it. Impermissible interference with state sovereignty is not within the enumerated powers of the National Government, see New York, 505 U. S., at 155–159, and action that exceeds the National Government’s enumerated powers undermines the sovereign interests of States. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 564 (1995). The unconstitutional action can cause concomitant injury to persons in individual cases.

An individual who challenges federal action on these grounds is, of course, subject to the Article III requirements, as well as prudential rules, applicable to all litigants and claims. Individuals have “no standing to complain simply that their Government is violating the law.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 755 (1984). It is not enough that a litigant “suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.” Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 488 (1923) (decided with Massachusetts v. Mellon). If, in connection with the claim being asserted, a litigant who commences suit fails to show actual or imminent harm that is concrete and particular, fairly traceable to the conduct complained of, and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision, the Federal Judiciary cannot hear the claim. Lujan, 504 U. S., at 560–561. These requirements must be satisfied before an individual may assert a constitutional claim; and in some instances, the result may bethat a State is the only entity capable of demonstrating the requisite injury.

In this case, however, where the litigant is a party to anotherwise justiciable case or controversy, she is not forbidden to object that her injury results from disregard of the federal structure of our Government. Whether the Tenth Amendment is regarded as simply a “‘truism,’” New York, supra, at 156 (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 124 (1941)), or whether it has independent force of its own, the result here is the same.

* * * There is no basis in precedent or principle to deny petitioner’s standing to raise her claims. The ultimate issue of the statute’s validity turns in part on whether the law canbe deemed “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the President’s Article II, §2 Treaty Power, see U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 18. This Court expresses no view on the merits of that argument. It can be addressed by the Court of Appeals on remand.The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

1 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) GINSBURG, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 09–1227

CAROL ANNE BOND, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[June 16, 2011]

JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins,concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion and write separately to makethe following observation. Bond, like any other defendant,has a personal right not to be convicted under a constitutionally invalid law. See Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 Harv. L. Rev.1321, 1331–1333 (2000); Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 3. See also North Carolina v. Pearce, 395

U. S. 711, 739 (1969) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Due process . . . is a guarantee that a man should be tried and convicted only in accordance with valid laws of the land.”).

In this case, Bond argues that the statute under which she was charged, 18 U. S. C. §229, exceeds Congress’ enumerated powers and violates the Tenth Amendment. Other defendants might assert that a law exceeds Congress’ power because it violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, or the Establishment Clause, or the Due Process Clause. Whatever the claim, success on the merits would require reversal of the conviction. “An offence created by [an unconstitutional law],” the Court has held, “is not a crime.” Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 376 (1880). “A conviction under [such a law] is not merely erroneous, but is illegal and void, and cannot be a legal cause of imprisonment.” Id., at 376–377. If a law is invalid as applied to the criminal defendant’s conduct, the defendant is entitled to go free.

For this reason, a court has no “prudential” license to decline to consider whether the statute under which the defendant has been charged lacks constitutional application to her conduct. And that is so even where the constitutional provision that would render the conviction void is directed at protecting a party not before the Court. Our decisions concerning criminal laws infected with discrimination are illustrative. The Court must entertain the objection—and reverse the conviction—even if the right to equal treatment resides in someone other than the defendant. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 452–455 (1972) (reversing conviction for distributing contraceptives because the law banning distribution violated the recipient’s right to equal protection); cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 192, 210, and n. 24 (1976) (law penalizing sale of beer to males but not females aged 18 to 20 could not be enforced against vendor). See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 107, n. 2 (1972); Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S. 333, 361–362 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result) (reversal required even if, going forward, Congress would cure the unequal treatment by extending rather than invalidating the criminal proscription).

In short, a law “beyond the power of Congress,” for any reason, is “no law at all.” Nigro v. United States, 276 U. S. 332, 341 (1928). The validity of Bond’s conviction depends upon whether the Constitution permits Congress to enact§229. Her claim that it does not must be considered and decided on the merits.

 




All writings by members of AbundantHope are copyrighted by
©2005-2019 AbundantHope - All rights reserved

Detailed explanation of AbundantHope's Copyrights are found here


Top of Page

True US History
Latest Headlines
Doug Casey Debunks Four Myths About Trump, Taxes, & The Economy
Everything You Need To Know About Trump (But Were Afraid To Admit You Wondered)
CIA Coup Plotters Clamor For “Golden Passports” In Bid To Flee Steel Barr Being Wielded By Trump
The Phony Anti-Defamation League’s Genocide Legislation
Are Democrats "Gerrymandering The Population" With Their Open-Borders Plans?
Exposing The Brennan Dossier: All About A Prime Mover Of Russiagate
Unreal: Democrats fining business owners in Denver for refusing to clean up human waste and used drug needles near their stores
Common Core: The Road to Planetary Serfdom
Obama Watching In Horror As Single Bible Topples Socialists In Bolivia Orders His Democrats To Stop Talking About Revolution
New Legislation Will Throw People In Jail For Disrespecting Cops
Google Exposed as the Big Tech Propaganda Branch of Big Pharma and the deadly vaccine industry
MEDICIDE: Doctors Blames SIDS After Infant Receives 8 Vaccines
Kanye West Led Great Awakening Event Casts New Light On “Trump Prophecy” Predicted By Hermit Of Loreto
"Impeachment against President Bush"
Clinton Begs Trump For Mercy After “Rabid Dog” Biden Provokes War And Democrats Stage Rebellion Against Leader Pelosi
Russian Students Flood Donations To CIA Whistleblower After They’re Ordered To Watch Trump Impeachment Hearing During Soviet History Classes
Ukraine Moves To Rejoin Russia While Watching America Destroy Itself With Trump Impeachment Coup
Casualties of War: Military Veterans Have Become America’s Walking Wounded
The So-Called War on Terror Has Killed Over 801,000 People and Cost $6.4 Trillion
Ivy League Professor Who Fled Communism Resigns, Saying Columbia University Is Becoming Communist