Zionism And The Third Reich By Mark Weber
Institute for Historical Review
2-8-3 Political Theatrics 23 dicembre 2009
Early in 1935, a passenger ship
bound for Haifa in Palestine left the German port of Bremerhaven. Its
stern bore the Hebrew letters for its name, “Tel Aviv,” while a
swastika banner fluttered from the mast. And although the ship was
Zionist-owned, its captain was a National Socialist Party member. Many
years later a traveler aboard the ship recalled this symbolic
combination as a “metaphysical absurdity.”1 Absurd or not, this is but
one vignette from a little-known chapter of history: The wide-ranging
collaboration between Zionism and Hitler’s Third Reich.
Common Aims
Over the years, people in many
different countries have wrestled with the “Jewish question”: that is,
what is the proper role of Jews in non-Jewish society? During the
1930s, Jewish Zionists and German National Socialists shared similar
views on how to deal with this perplexing issue. They agreed that Jews
and Germans were distinctly different nationalities, and that Jews did
not belong in Germany. Jews living in the Reich were therefore to be
regarded not as “Germans of the Jewish faith,” but rather as members of
a separate national community. Zionism (Jewish nationalism) also
implied an obligation by Zionist Jews to resettle in Palestine, the
“Jewish homeland.” They could hardly regard themselves as sincere
Zionists and simultaneously claim equal rights in Germany or any other
“foreign” country.
Theodor Herzl (1860-1904), the
founder of modern Zionism, maintained that anti-Semitism is not an
aberration, but a natural and completely understandable response by
non-Jews to alien Jewish behavior and attitudes. The only solution, he
argued, is for Jews to recognize reality and live in a separate state
of their own. “The Jewish question exists wherever Jews live in
noticeable numbers,” he wrote in his most influential work, The Jewish
State. “Where it does not exist, it is brought in by arriving Jews … I
believe I understand anti-Semitism, which is a very complex phenomenon.
I consider this development as a Jew, without hate or fear.” The Jewish
question, he maintained, is not social or religious. “It is a national
question. To solve it we must, above all, make it an international
political issue …” Regardless of their citizenship, Herzl insisted,
Jews constitute not merely a religious community, but a nationality, a
people, a Volk.2 Zionism, wrote Herzl, offered the world a welcome
“final solution of the Jewish question.”3
Six months after Hitler came to
power, the Zionist Federation of Germany (by far the largest Zionist
group in the country) submitted a detailed memorandum to the new
government that reviewed German-Jewish relations and formally offered
Zionist support in “solving” the vexing “Jewish question.” The first
step, it suggested, had to be a frank recognition of fundamental
national differences: 4
Zionism has no illusions about
the difficulty of the Jewish condition, which consists above all in an
abnormal occupational pattern and in the fault of an intellectual and
moral posture not rooted in one’s own tradition. Zionism recognized
decades ago that as a result of the assimilationist trend, symptoms of
deterioration were bound to appear …
Zionism believes that the rebirth
of the national life of a people, which is now occurring in Germany
through the emphasis on its Christian and national character, must also
come about in the Jewish national group. For the Jewish people, too,
national origin, religion, common destiny and a sense of its uniqueness
must be of decisive importance in the shaping of its existence. This
means that the egotistical individualism of the liberal era must be
overcome and replaced with a sense of community and collective
responsibility …
We believe it is precisely the
new [National Socialist] Germany that can, through bold resoluteness in
the handling of the Jewish question, take a decisive step toward
overcoming a problem which, in truth, will have to be dealt with by
most European peoples …
Our acknowledgment of Jewish
nationality provides for a clear and sincere relationship to the German
people and its national and racial realities. Precisely because we do
not wish to falsify these fundamentals, because we, too, are against
mixed marriage and are for maintaining the purity of the Jewish group
and reject any trespasses in the cultural domain, we — having been
brought up in the German language and German culture — can show an
interest in the works and values of German culture with admiration and
internal sympathy …
For its practical aims, Zionism
hopes to be able to win the collaboration of even a government
fundamentally hostile to Jews, because in dealing with the Jewish
question not sentimentalities are involved but a real problem whose
solution interests all peoples and at the present moment especially the
German people … Boycott propaganda — such as is currently being carried
on against Germany in many ways — is in essence un-Zionist, because
Zionism wants not to do battle but to convince and to build …
We are not blind to the fact that
a Jewish question exists and will continue to exist. From the abnormal
situation of the Jews severe disadvantages result for them, but also
scarcely tolerable conditions for other peoples. The Federation’s
paper, the Jüdische Rundschau (”Jewish Review”), proclaimed the same
message: “Zionism recognizes the existence of a Jewish problem and
desires a far-reaching and constructive solution. For this purpose
Zionism wishes to obtain the assistance of all peoples, whether pro- or
anti-Jewish, because, in its view, we are dealing here with a concrete
rather than a sentimental problem, the solution of which all peoples
are interested.”5 A young Berlin rabbi, Joachim Prinz, who later
settled in the United States and became head of the American Jewish
Congress, wrote in his 1934 book, Wir Juden (”We Jews”), that the
National Socialist revolution in Germany meant “Jewry for the Jews.” He
explained: “No subterfuge can save us now. In place of assimilation we
desire a new concept: recognition of the Jewish nation and Jewish
race.” 6
Active Collaboration
On this basis of their similar
ideologies about ethnicity and nationhood, National Socialists and
Zionists worked together for what each group believed was in its own
national interest. As a result, the Hitler government vigorously
supported Zionism and Jewish emigration to Palestine from 1933 until
1940-1941, when the Second World War prevented extensive collaboration.
Even as the Third Reich became
more entrenched, many German Jews, probably a majority, continued to
regard themselves, often with considerable pride, as Germans first. Few
were enthusiastic about pulling up roots to begin a new life in
far-away Palestine. Nevertheless, more and more German Jews turned to
Zionism during this period. Until late 1938, the Zionist movement
flourished in Germany under Hitler. The circulation of the Zionist
Federation’s bi-weekly Jüdische Rundschau grew enormously. Numerous
Zionist books were published. “Zionist work was in full swing” in
Germany during those years, the Encyclopaedia Judaica notes. A Zionist
convention held in Berlin in 1936 reflected “in its composition the
vigorous party life of German Zionists.”7
The SS was particularly
enthusiastic in its support for Zionism. An internal June 1934 SS
position paper urged active and wide-ranging support for Zionism by the
government and the Party as the best way to encourage emigration of
Germany’s Jews to Palestine. This would require increased Jewish
self-awareness. Jewish schools, Jewish sports leagues, Jewish cultural
organizations — in short, everything that would encourage this new
consciousness and self-awareness – should be promoted, the paper
recommended.8
SS officer Leopold von
Mildenstein and Zionist Federation official Kurt Tuchler toured
Palestine together for six months to assess Zionist development there.
Based on his firsthand observations, von Mildenstein wrote a series of
twelve illustrated articles for the important Berlin daily Der Angriff
that appeared in late 1934 under the heading “A Nazi Travels to
Palestine.” The series expressed great admiration for the pioneering
spirit and achievements of the Jewish settlers. Zionist
self-development, von Mildenstein wrote, had produced a new kind of
Jew. He praised Zionism as a great benefit for both the Jewish people
and the entire world. A Jewish homeland in Palestine, he wrote in his
concluding article, “pointed the way to curing a centuries-long wound
on the body of the world: the Jewish question.” Der Angriff issued a
special medal, with a Swastika on one side and a Star of David on the
other, to commemorate the joint SS-Zionist visit. A few months after
the articles appeared, von Mildenstein was promoted to head the Jewish
affairs department of the SS security service in order to support
Zionist migration and development more effectively. 9
The official SS newspaper, Das
Schwarze Korps, proclaimed its support for Zionism in a May 1935
front-page editorial: “The time may not be too far off when Palestine
will again be able to receive its sons who have been lost to it for
more than a thousand years. Our good wishes, together with official
goodwill, go with them.”10 Four months later, a similar article
appeared in the SS paper: 11
The recognition of Jewry as a
racial community based on blood and not on religion leads the German
government to guarantee without reservation the racial separateness of
this community. The government finds itself in complete agreement with
the great spiritual movement within Jewry, the so-called Zionism, with
its recognition of the solidarity of Jewry around the world and its
rejection of all assimilationist notions. On this basis, Germany
undertakes measures that will surely play a significant role in the
future in the handling of the Jewish problem around the world.
A leading German shipping line
began direct passenger liner service from Hamburg to Haifa, Palestine,
in October 1933 providing “strictly kosher food on its ships, under the
supervision of the Hamburg rabbinate.” 12 With official backing,
Zionists worked tirelessly to “reeducate” Germany’s Jews. As American
historian Francis Nicosia put it in his 1985 survey, The Third Reich
and the Palestine Question: “Zionists were encouraged to take their
message to the Jewish community, to collect money, to show films on
Palestine and generally to educate German Jews about Palestine. There
was considerable pressure to teach Jews in Germany to cease identifying
themselves as Germans and to awaken a new Jewish national identity in
them.” 13
In an interview after the war,
the former head of the Zionist Federation of Germany, Dr. Hans
Friedenthal, summed up the situation: “The Gestapo did everything in
those days to promote emigration, particularly to Palestine. We often
received their help when we required anything from other authorities
regarding preparations for emigration.” 14
At the September 1935 National
Socialist Party Congress, the Reichstag adopted the so-called
“Nuremberg laws” that prohibited marriages and sexual relations between
Jews and Germans and, in effect, proclaimed the Jews an alien minority
nationality. A few days later the Zionist Jüdische Rundschau
editorially welcomed the new measures: 15
Germany … is meeting the demands
of the World Zionist Congress when it declares the Jews now living in
Germany to be a national minority. Once the Jews have been stamped a
national minority it is again possible to establish normal relations
between the German nation and Jewry. The new laws give the Jewish
minority in Germany its own cultural life, its own national life. In
future it will be able to shape its own schools, its own theatre, and
its own sports associations. In short, it can create its own future in
all aspects of national life …
Germany has given the Jewish
minority the opportunity to live for itself, and is offering state
protection for this separate life of the Jewish minority: Jewry’s
process of growth into a nation will thereby be encouraged and a
contribution will be made to the establishment of more tolerable
relations between the two nations. Georg Kareski, the head of both the
“Revisionist” Zionist State Organization and the Jewish Cultural
League, and former head of the Berlin Jewish Community, declared in an
interview with the Berlin daily Der Angriff at the end of 1935: 16
For many years I have regarded a
complete separation of the cultural affairs of the two peoples [Jews
and Germans] as a pre-condition for living together without conflict… I
have long supported such a separation, provided it is founded on
respect for the alien nationality. The Nuremberg Laws … seem to me,
apart from their legal provisions, to conform entirely with this desire
for a separate life based on mutual respect… This interruption of the
process of dissolution in many Jewish communities, which had been
promoted through mixed marriages, is therefore, from a Jewish point of
view, entirely welcome.
Zionist leaders in other
countries echoed these views. Stephen S. Wise, president of the
American Jewish Congress and the World Jewish Congress, told a New York
rally in June 1938: “I am not an American citizen of the Jewish faith,
I am a Jew… Hitler was right in one thing. He calls the Jewish people a
race and we are a race.” 17 The Interior Ministry’s Jewish affairs
specialist, Dr. Bernhard Lösener, expressed support for Zionism in an
article that appeared in a November 1935 issue of the official
Reichsverwaltungsblatt: 18
If the Jews already had their own
state in which the majority of them were settled, then the Jewish
question could be regarded as completely resolved today, also for the
Jews themselves. The least amount of opposition to the ideas underlying
the Nuremberg Laws have been shown by the Zionists, because they
realize at once that these laws represent the only correct solution for
the Jewish people as well. For each nation must have its own state as
the outward expression of its particular nationhood.
In cooperation with the German
authorities, Zionist groups organized a network of some forty camps and
agricultural centers throughout Germany where prospective settlers were
trained for their new lives in Palestine. Although the Nuremberg Laws
forbid Jews from displaying the German flag, Jews were specifically
guaranteed the right to display the blue and white Jewish national
banner. The flag that would one day be adopted by Israel was flown at
the Zionist camps and centers in Hitler’s Germany. 19
Himmler’s security service
cooperated with the Haganah, the Zionist underground military
organization in Palestine. The SS agency paid Haganah official Feivel
Polkes for information about the situation in Palestine and for help in
directing Jewish emigration to that country. Meanwhile, the Haganah was
kept well informed about German plans by a spy it managed to plant in
the Berlin headquarters of the SS.20 Haganah-SS collaboration even
included secret deliveries of German weapons to Jewish settlers for use
in clashes with Palestinian Arabs. 21 In the aftermath of the November
1938 “Kristallnacht” outburst of violence and destruction, the SS
quickly helped the Zionist organization to get back on its feet and
continue its work in Germany, although now under more restricted
supervision. 22
Official Reservations
German support for Zionism was
not unlimited. Government and Party officials were very mindful of the
continuing campaign by powerful Jewish communities in the United
States, Britain and other countries to mobilize “their” governments and
fellow citizens against Germany. As long as world Jewry remained
implacably hostile toward National Socialist Germany, and as long as
the great majority of Jews around the world showed little eagerness to
resettle in the Zionist “promised land,” a sovereign Jewish state in
Palestine would not really “solve” the international Jewish question.
Instead, German officials reasoned, it would immeasurably strengthen
this dangerous anti-German campaign. German backing for Zionism was
therefore limited to support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine under
British control, not a sovereign Jewish state. 23
A Jewish state in Palestine, the
Foreign Minister informed diplomats in June 1937, would not be in
Germany’s interest because it would not be able to absorb all Jews
around the world, but would only serve as an additional power base for
international Jewry, in much the same way as Moscow served as a base
for international Communism.24 Reflecting something of a shift in
official policy, the German press expressed much greater sympathy in
1937 for Palestinian Arab resistance to Zionist ambitions, at a time
when tension and conflict between Jews and Arabs in Palestine was
sharply increasing. 25
A Foreign Office circular
bulletin of June 22, 1937, cautioned that in spite of support for
Jewish settlement in Palestine, “it would nevertheless be a mistake to
assume that Germany supports the formation of a state structure in
Palestine under some form of Jewish control. In view of the anti-German
agitation of international Jewry, Germany cannot agree that the
formation of a Palestine Jewish state would help the peaceful
development of the nations of the world.”26 “The proclamation of a
Jewish state or a Jewish-administrated Palestine,” warned an internal
memorandum by the Jewish affairs section of the SS, “would create for
Germany a new enemy, one that would have a deep influence on
developments in the Near East.” Another SS agency predicted that a
Jewish state “would work to bring special minority protection to Jews
in every country, therefore giving legal protection to the exploitation
activity of world Jewry.”27 In January 1939, Hitler’s new Foreign
Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, likewise warned in another circular
bulletin that “Germany must regard the formation of a Jewish state as
dangerous” because it “would bring an international increase in power
to world Jewry.” 28
Hitler himself personally
reviewed this entire issue in early 1938 and, in spite of his
long-standing skepticism of Zionist ambitions and misgivings that his
policies might contribute to the formation of a Jewish state, decided
to support Jewish migration to Palestine even more vigorously. The
prospect of ridding Germany of its Jews, he concluded, outweighed the
possible dangers. 29
Meanwhile, the British government
imposed ever more drastic restrictions on Jewish immigration into
Palestine in 1937, 1938 and 1939. In response, the SS security service
concluded a secret alliance with the clandestine Zionist agency Mossad
le-Aliya Bet to smuggle Jews illegally into Palestine. As a result of
this intensive collaboration, several convoys of ships succeeded in
reaching Palestine past British gunboats. Jewish migration, both legal
and illegal, from Germany (including Austria) to Palestine increased
dramatically in 1938 and 1939. Another 10,000 Jews were scheduled to
depart in October 1939, but the outbreak of war in September brought
the effort to an end. All the same, German authorities continued to
promote indirect Jewish emigration to Palestine during 1940 and 1941.
30 Even as late as March 1942, at least one officially authorized
Zionist “kibbutz” training camp for potential emigrants continued to
operate in Hitler’s Germany. 31
The Transfer Agreement
The centerpiece of German-Zionist
cooperation during the Hitler era was the Transfer Agreement, a pact
that enabled tens of thousands of German Jews to migrate to Palestine
with their wealth. The Agreement, also known as the Haavara (Hebrew for
“transfer”), was concluded in August 1933 following talks between
German officials and Chaim Arlosoroff, Political Secretary of the
Jewish Agency, the Palestine center of the World Zionist Organization.
32
Through this unusual arrangement,
each Jew bound for Palestine deposited money in a special account in
Germany. The money was used to purchase German-made agricultural tools,
building materials, pumps, fertilizer, and so forth, which were
exported to Palestine and sold there by the Jewish-owned Haavara
company in Tel-Aviv. Money from the sales was given to the Jewish
emigrant upon his arrival in Palestine in an amount corresponding to
his deposit in Germany. German goods poured into Palestine through the
Haavara, which was supplemented a short time later with a barter
agreement by which Palestine oranges were exchanged for German timber,
automobiles, agricultural machinery, and other goods. The Agreement
thus served the Zionist aim of bringing Jewish settlers and development
capital to Palestine, while simultaneously serving the German goal of
freeing the country of an unwanted alien group.
Delegates at the 1933 Zionist
Congress in Prague vigorously debated the merits of the Agreement. Some
feared that the pact would undermine the international Jewish economic
boycott against Germany. But Zionist officials reassured the Congress.
Sam Cohen, a key figure behind the Haavara arrangement, stressed that
the Agreement was not economically advantageous to Germany. Arthur
Ruppin, a Zionist Organization emigration specialist who had helped
negotiate the pact, pointed out that “the Transfer Agreement in no way
interfered with the boycott movement, since no new currency will flow
into Germany as a result of the agreement…” 33 The 1935 Zionist
Congress, meeting in Switzerland, overwhelmingly endorsed the pact. In
1936, the Jewish Agency (the Zionist “shadow government” in Palestine)
took over direct control of the Ha’avara, which remained in effect
until the Second World War forced its abandonment.
Some German officials opposed the
arrangement. Germany’s Consul General in Jerusalem, Hans Döhle, for
example, sharply criticized the Agreement on several occasions during
1937. He pointed out that it cost Germany the foreign exchange that the
products exported to Palestine through the pact would bring if sold
elsewhere. The Haavara monopoly sale of German goods to Palestine
through a Jewish agency naturally angered German businessmen and Arabs
there. Official German support for Zionism could lead to a loss of
German markets throughout the Arab world. The British government also
resented the arrangement.34 A June 1937 German Foreign Office internal
bulletin referred to the “foreign exchange sacrifices” that resulted
from the Haavara. 35
A December 1937 internal
memorandum by the German Interior Ministry reviewed the impact of the
Transfer Agreement: “There is no doubt that the Haavara arrangement has
contributed most significantly to the very rapid development of
Palestine since 1933. The Agreement provided not only the largest
source of money (from Germany!), but also the most intelligent group of
immigrants, a nd finally it brought to the country the machines and
industrial products essential for development.” The main advantage of
the pact, the memo reported, was the emigration of large numbers of
Jews to Palestine, the most desirable target country as far as Germany
was concerned. But the paper also noted the important drawbacks pointed
out by Consul Döhle and others. The Interior Minister, it went on, had
concluded that the disadvantages of the agreement now outweighed the
advantages and that, therefore, it should be terminated. 36
Only one man could resolve the
controversy. Hitler personally reviewed the policy in July and
September 1937, and again in January 1938, and each time decided to
maintain the Haavara arrangement. The goal of removing Jews from
Germany, he concluded, justified the drawbacks. 37
The Reich Economics Ministry
helped to organize another transfer company, the International Trade
and Investment Agency, or Intria, through which Jews in foreign
countries could help German Jews emigrate to Palestine. Almost $900,000
was eventually channeled through the Intria to German Jews in
Palestine.38 Other European countries eager to encourage Jewish
emigration concluded agreements with the Zionists modeled after the
Ha’avara. In 1937 Poland authorized the Halifin (Hebrew for “exchange”)
transfer company. By late summer 1939, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary
and Italy had signed similar arrangements. The outbreak of war in
September 1939, however, prevented large-scale implementation of these
agreements. 39
Achievements of Haavara
Between 1933 and 1941, some
60,000 German Jews emigrated to Palestine through the Ha’avara and
other German-Zionist arrangements, or about ten percent of Germany’s
1933 Jewish population. (These German Jews made up about 15 percent of
Palestine’s 1939 Jewish population.) Some Ha’avara emigrants
transferred considerable personal wealth from Germany to Palestine. As
Jewish historian Edwin Black has noted: “Many of these people,
especially in the late 1930s, were allowed to transfer actual replicas
of their homes and factories — indeed rough replicas of their very
existence.”40
The total amount transferred from
Germany to Palestine through the Ha’avara between August 1933 and the
end of 1939 was 8.1 million pounds or 139.57 million German marks (then
equivalent to more than $40 million). This amount included 33.9 million
German marks ($13.8 million) provided by the Reichsbank in connection
with the Agreement.41
Historian Black has estimated
that an additional $70 million may have flowed into Palestine through
corollary German commercial agreements and special international
banking transactions. The German funds had a major impact on a country
as underdeveloped as Palestine was in the 1930s, he pointed out.
Several major industrial enterprises were built with the capital from
Germany, including the Mekoroth waterworks and the Lodzia textile firm.
The influx of Ha’avara goods and capital, concluded Black, “produced an
economic explosion in Jewish Palestine” and was “an indispensable
factor in the creation of the State of Israel.”42
The Ha’avara agreement greatly
contributed to Jewish development in Palestine and thus, indirectly, to
the foundation of the Israeli state. A January 1939 German Foreign
Office circular bulletin reported, with some misgiving, that “the
transfer of Jewish property out of Germany [through the Ha'avara
agreement] contributed to no small extent to the building of a Jewish
state in Palestine.”43
Former officials of the Ha’avara
company in Palestine confirmed this view in a detailed study of the
Transfer Agreement published in 1972: “The economic activity made
possible by the influx German capital and the Haavara transfers to the
private and public sectors were of greatest importance for the
country’s development. Many new industries and commercial enterprises
were established in Jewish Palestine, and numerous companies that are
enormously important even today in the economy of the State of Israel
owe their existence to the Haavara.”44
Dr. Ludwig Pinner, a Ha’avara
company official in Tel Aviv during the 1930s, later commented that the
exceptionally competent Ha’avara immigrants “decisively contributed” to
the economic, social, cultural and educational development of
Palestine’s Jewish community.45
The Transfer Agreement was the
most far-reaching example of cooperation between Hitler’s Germany and
international Zionism. Through this pact, Hitler’s Third Reich did more
than any other government during the 1930s to support Jewish
development in Palestine.
Zionists Offer a Military Alliance With Hitler
In early January 1941 a small but
important Zionist organization submitted a formal proposal to German
diplomats in Beirut for a military-political alliance with wartime
Germany. The offer was made by the radical underground “Fighters for
the Freedom of Israel,” better known as the Lehi or Stern Gang. Its
leader, Avraham Stern, had recently broken with the radical nationalist
“National Military Organization” (Irgun Zvai Leumi) over the group’s
attitude toward Britain, which had effectively banned further Jewish
settlement of Palestine. Stern regarded Britain as the main enemy of
Zionism.
This remarkable Zionist proposal
“for the solution of the Jewish question in Europe and the active
participation of the NMO [Lehi] in the war on the side of Germany” is
worth quoting at some length:46
In their speeches and statements,
the leading statesmen of National Socialist Germany have often
emphasized that a New Order in Europe requires as a prerequisite a
radical solution of the Jewish question by evacuation. (”Jew-f ree
Europe”)
The evacuation of the Jewish
masses from Europe is a precondition for solving the Jewish question.
However, the only way this can be totally achieved is through
settlement of these masses in the homeland of the Jewish people,
Palestine, and by the establishment of a Jewish state in its historical
boundaries.
The goal of the political
activity and the years of struggle by the Israel Freedom Movement, the
National Military Organization in Palestine (Irgun Zvai Leumi), is to
solve the Jewish problem in this way and thus completely liberate the
Jewish people forever.
The NMO, which is very familiar
with the good will of the German Reich government and its officials
towards Zionist activities within Germany and the Zionist emigration
program, takes that view that:
1. Common interests
can exist between a European New Order based on the German concept and
the true national aspirations of the Jewish people as embodied by the
NMO.
2. Cooperation is possible between the New Germany and a renewed, folk ish-national Jewry [Hebr_ertum].
3. The establishment of the
historical Jewish state on a national and totalitarian basis, and bound
by treaty with the German Reich, would be in the interest of
maintaining and strengthening the future German position of power in
the Near East.
On the basis of these
considerations, and upon the condition that the German Reich government
recognize the national aspirations of the Israel Freedom Movement
mentioned above, the NMO in Palestine offers to actively take part in
the war on the side of Germany.
This offer by the NMO could
include military, political and informational activity within Palestine
and, after certain organizational measures, outside as well. Along with
this the Jewish men of Europe would be militarily trained and organized
in military units under the leadership and command of the NMO. They
would take part in combat operations for the purpose of conquering
Palestine, should such a front by formed.
The indirect participation of the
Israel Freedom Movement in the New Order of Europe, already in the
preparatory stage, combined with a positive-radical solution of the
European Jewish problem on the basis of the national aspirations of the
Jewish people mentioned above, would greatly strengthen the moral
foundation of the New Order in the eyes of all humanity.
The cooperation of the Israel
Freedom Movement would also be consistent with a recent speech by the
German Reich Chancellor, in which Hitler stressed that he would utilize
any combination and coalition in order to isolate and defeat England.
There is no record of any German
response. Acceptance was very unlikely anyway because by this time
German policy was decisively pro-Arab.47 Remarkably, Stern’s group
sought to conclude a pact with the Third Reich at a time when stories
that Hitler was bent on exterminating Jews were already in wide
circulation. Stern apparently either did not believe the stories or he
was willing to collaborate with the mortal enemy of his people to help
bring about a Jewish state. 48
An important Lehi member at the
time the group made this offer was Yitzhak Shamir, who later served as
Israel’s Foreign Minister and then, during much of the 1980s and until
June 1992, as Prime Minister. As Lehi operations chief following
Stern’s death in 1942, Shamir organized numerous acts of terror,
including the November 1944 assassination of British Middle East
Minister Lord Moyne and the September 1948 slaying of Swedish United
Nations mediator Count Bernadotte. Years later, when Shamir was asked
about the 1941 offer, he confirmed that he was aware of his
organization’s proposed alliance with wartime Germany. 49
Conclusion
In spite of the basic hostility
between the Hitler regime and international Jewry, for several years
Jewish Zionist and German National Socialist interests coincided. In
collaborating with the Zionists for a mutually desirable and humane
solution to a complex problem, the Third Reich was willing to make
foreign exchange sacrifices, impair relations with Britain and anger
the Arabs. Indeed, during the 1930s no nation did more to substantively
further Jewish-Zionist goals than Hitler’s Germany.
1.W. Martini, "Hebr_isch unterm Hakenkreuz,"
Die Welt (Hamburg), Jan. 10, 1975. Cited in: Klaus Polken, "The Secret
Contacts: Zionism and Nazi Germany, 1933-1941," Journal of Palestine
Studies, Spring-Summer 1976, p. 65. 2.Quoted in: Ingrid Weckert, Feuerzeichen:
Die "Reichskristallnacht" (Tübingen: Grabert, 1981), p.
212. See also: Th. Herzl, The Jewish State (New York: Herzl Press, 1970),
pp. 33, 35, 36, and, Edwin Black, The Transfer Agreement (New York: Macmillan,
1984), p. 73. 3.Th. Herzl, "Der Kongress," Welt, June 4, 1897.
Reprinted in: Theodor Herzls zionistische Schriften (Leon Kellner, ed.),
erster Teil, Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag, 1920, p. 190 (and p. 139).
4.Memo of June 21, 1933, in: L. Dawidowicz, A Holocaust Reader (New York:
Behrman, 1976), pp. 150-155, and (in part) in: Francis R. Nicosia, The
Third Reich and the Palestine Question (Austin: Univ. of Texas, 1985),
p. 42.; On Zionism in Germany before Hitler's assumption of power, see:
Donald L. Niewyk, The Jews in Weimar Germany (Baton Rouge: 1980), pp. 94-95,
126-131, 140-143.; F. Nicosia, Third Reich (Austin: 1985), pp. 1-15. 5.Jüdische
Rundschau (Berlin), June 13, 1933. Quoted in: Heinz H_hne, The Order of
the Death's Head (New York: Ballantine, pb., 1971, 1984), pp. 376-377.
6.Heinz Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head (Ballantine, 1971, 1984),
p. 376. 7."Berlin," Encyclopaedia Judaica (New York and Jerusalem:
1971), Vol. 5, p. 648. For a look at one aspect of this "vigorous
life," see: J.-C. Horak, "Zionist Film Propaganda in Nazi Germany,"
Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1984,
pp. 49-58. 8.Francis R. Nicosia, The Third Reich and the Palestine Question
(1985), pp. 54-55.; Karl A. Schleunes, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz (Urbana:
Univ. of Illinois, 1970, 1990), pp. 178-181. 9.Jacob Boas, "A Nazi
Travels to Palestine," History Today (London), January 1980, pp. 33-38.
10.Facsimile reprint of front page of Das Schwarze Korps, May 15, 1935,
in: Janusz Piekalkiewicz, Israels Langer Arm (Frankfurt: Goverts, 1975),
pp. 66-67. Also quoted in: Heinz H_hne, The Order of the Death's Head (Ballantine,
1971, 1984), p. 377. See also: Erich Kern, ed., Verheimlichte Dokumente
(Munich: FZ-Verlag, 1988), p. 184. 11.Das Schwarze Korps, Sept. 26, 1935.
Quoted in: F. Nicosia, The Third Reich and the Palestine Question (1985),
pp. 56-57. 12.Lenni Brenner, Zionism in the Age of the Dictators (1983),
p. 83. 13.F. Nicosia, The Third Reich and the Palestine Question (1985),
p. 60. See also: F. Nicosia, "The Yishuv and the Holocaust,"
The Journal of Modern History (Chicago), Vol. 64, No. 3, Sept. 1992, pp.
533-540. 14.F. Nicosia, The Third Reich and the Palestine Question (1985),
p. 57. 15.Jüdische Rundschau, Sept. 17, 1935. Quoted in: Yitzhak Arad,
with Y. Gutman and A. Margaliot, eds., Documents on the Holocaust (Jerusalem:
Yad Vashem, 1981), pp. 82-83. 16.Der Angriff, Dec. 23, 1935, in: E. Kern,
ed., Verheimlichte Dokumente (Munich: 1988), p. 148.; F. Nicosia, Third
Reich (1985), p. 56.; L. Brenner, Zionism in the Age of the Dictators (1983),
p. 138.; A. Margaliot, "The Reaction...," Yad Vashem Studies
(Jerusalem), vol. 12, 1977, pp. 90-91.; On Kareski's remarkable career,
see: H. Levine, "A Jewish Collaborator in Nazi Germany," Central
European History (Atlanta), Sept. 1975, pp. 251-281. 17."Dr. Wise
Urges Jews to Declare Selves as Such," New York Herald Tribune, June
13, 1938, p. 12. 18.F. Nicosia, The Third Reich (1985), p. 53. 19.Lucy
Dawidowicz, The War Against the Jews, 1933-1945 (New York: Bantam, pb.,
1976), pp. 253-254.; Max Nussbaum, "Zionism Under Hitler," Congress
Weekly (New York: American Jewish Congress), Sept. 11, 1942.; F. Nicosia,
The Third Reich (1985), pp. 58-60, 217.; Edwin Black, The Transfer Agreement
(1984), p. 175. 20.H. H_hne, The Order of the Death's Head (Ballantine,
pb., 1984), pp. 380-382.; K. Schleunes, Twisted Road (1970, 1990), p. 226.;
Secret internal SS intelligence report about F. Polkes, June 17, 1937,
in: John Mendelsohn, ed., The Holocaust (New York: Garland, 1982), vol.
5, pp. 62-64. 21.F. Nicosia, Third Reich (1985), pp. 63-64, 105, 219-220.
22.F. Nicosia, Third Reich (1985), p. 160. 23.This distinction is also
implicit in the "Balfour Declaration" of November 1917, in which
the British government expressed support for "a national home for
the Jewish people" in Palestine, while carefully avoiding any mention
of a Jewish state. Referring to the majority Arab population there, the
Declaration went on to caution, "...it being clearly understood that
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights
of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." The complete text
of the Declaration is reproduced in facsimile in: Robert John, Behind the
Balfour Declaration (IHR, 1988), p. 32. 24.F. Nicosia, Third Reich (1985),
p. 121. 25.F. Nicosia, Third Reich (1985), p. 124. 26.David Yisraeli, The
Palestine Problem in German Politics 1889-1945 (Bar-Ilan University, Israel,
1974), p. 300.; Also in: Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D,
Vol. 5. Doc. No. 564 or 567. 27.K. Schleunes, The Twisted Road (1970, 1990),
p. 209. 28.Circular of January 25, 1939. Nuremberg document 3358-PS. International
Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International
Military Tribunal (Nuremberg: 1947-1949), vol. 32, pp. 242-243. Nazi Conspiracy
and Aggression (Washington, DC: 1946-1948), vol. 6, pp. 92-93. 29.F. Nicosia,
Third Reich (1985), pp. 141-144.; On Hitler's critical view of Zionism
in Mein Kampf, see esp. Vol. 1, Chap. 11. Quoted in: Robert Wistrich, Hitler's
Apocalypse (London: 1985), p. 155.; See also: F. Nicosia, Third Reich (1985),
pp. 26-28.; Hitler told his army adjutant in 1939 and again in 1941 that
he had asked the British in 1937 about transferring all of Germany's Jews
to Palestine or Egypt. The British rejected the proposal, he said, because
it would cause further disorder. See: H. v. Kotze, ed., Heeresadjutant
bei Hitler (Stuttgart: 1974), pp. 65, 95. 30.F. Nicosia, Third Reich (1985),
pp. 156, 160-164, 166-167.; H. H_hne, The Order of the Death's Head (Ballantine,
pb., 1984), pp. 392-394.; Jon and David Kimche, The Secret Roads (London:
Secker and Warburg, 1955), pp. 39-43. See also: David Yisraeli, "The
Third Reich and Palestine," Middle Eastern Studies, October 1971,
p. 347.; Bernard Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe, 1939-1945
(1979), pp. 43, 49, 52, 60.; T. Kelly, "Man who fooled Nazis,"
Washington Times, April 28, 1987, pp. 1B, 4B. Based on interview with Willy
Perl, author of The Holocaust Conspiracy. 31.Y. Arad, et al., eds., Documents
On the Holocaust (1981), p. 155. (The training kibbutz was at Neuendorf,
and may have functioned even after March 1942.) 32.On the Agreement in
general, see: Werner Feilchenfeld, et al., Haavara-Transfer nach Palaestina
(Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1972).; David Yisraeli, "The Third Reich
and the Transfer Agreement," Journal of Contemporary History (London),
No. 2, 1971, pp. 129-148.; "Haavara," Encyclopaedia Judaica (1971),
vol. 7, pp. 1012-1013.; F. Nicosia, The Third Reich and the Palestine Question
(Austin: 1985), pp. 44-49.; Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European
Jews (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985), pp. 140-141.; The Transfer Agreement,
by Edwin Black, is detailed and useful. However, it contains numerous inaccuracies
and wildly erroneous conclusions. See, for example, the review by Richard
S. Levy in Commentary, Sept. 1984, pp. 68-71. 33.E. Black, The Transfer
Agreement (1984), pp. 328, 337. 34.On opposition to the Haavara in official
German circles, see: W. Feilchenfeld, et al., Haavara-Transfer nach Palaestina
(1972), pp. 31-33.; D. Yisraeli, "The Third Reich," Journal of
Contemporary History, 1971, pp. 136-139.; F. Nicosia, The Third Reich and
the Palestine Question, pp. 126-139.; I. Weckert, Feuerzeichen (1981),
pp. 226-227.; Rolf Vogel, Ein Stempel hat gefehlt (Munich: Droemer Knaur,
1977), pp. 110 ff. 35.W. Feilchenfeld, et al., Haavara-Transfer (1972),
p. 31. Entire text in: David Yisraeli, The Palestine Problem in German
Politics 1889-1945 (Israel: 1974), pp. 298-300. 36.Interior Ministry internal
memo (signed by State Secretary W. Stuckart), Dec. 17, 1937, in: Helmut
Eschwege, ed., Kennzeichen J (Berlin: 1966), pp. 132-136. 37.W. Feilchenfeld,
et al, Haavara-Transfer (1972), p. 32. 38.E. Black, Transfer Agreement,
pp. 376-377. 39.E. Black, Transfer Agreement (1984), pp. 376, 378.; F.
Nicosia, Third Reich (1985), pp. 238-239 (n. 91). 40.E. Black, Transfer
Agreement, p. 379.; F. Nicosia, Third Reich, pp. 212, 255 (n. 66). 41.W.
Feilchenfeld, et al., Haavara-Transfer, p. 75.; "Haavara," Encyclopaedia
Judaica, (1971), Vol. 7, p. 1013. 42.E. Black, Transfer Agreement, pp.
379, 373, 382. 43.Circular of January 25, 1939. Nuremberg document 3358-PS.
International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before
the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg: 1947-1949), Vol. 32, pp.
242-243. 44.Werner Feilchenfeld, et al., Haavara-Transfer nach Palaestina
(Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1972). Quoted in: Ingrid Weckert, Feuerzeichen
(Tübingen: Grabert, 1981), pp. 222-223. 45.W. Feilchenfeld, et al.,
Haavara-Transfer nach Palaestina (1972). Quoted in: I. Weckert, Feuerzeichen
(1981), p. 224. 46.Original document in German Ausw_rtiges Amt Archiv,
Bestand 47-59, E 224152 and E 234155-58. (Photocopy in author's possession).;
Complete original German text published in: David Yisraeli, The Palestine
Problem in German Politics 1889-1945 (Israel: 1974), pp. 315-317. See also:
Klaus Polkhen, "The Secret Contacts," Journal of Palestine Studies,
Spring-Summer 1976, pp. 78-80.; (At the time this offer was made, Stern's
Lehi group still regarded itself as the true Irgun/NMO.) 47.Arab nationalists
opposed Britain, which then dominated much of the Arab world, including
Egypt, Iraq and Palestine. Because Britain and Germany were at war, Germany
cultivated Arab support. The leader of Palestine's Arabs, the Grand Mufti
of Jerusalem, Haj Amin el-Husseini, worked closely with Germany during
the war years. After escaping from Palestine, he spoke to the Arab world
over German radio and helped raise Muslim recruits in Bosnia for the Waffen
SS. 48.Israel Shahak, "Yitzhak Shamir, Then and Now," Middle
East Policy (Washington, DC), Vol. 1, No. 1, (Whole No. 39), 1992, pp.
27-38.; Yehoshafat Harkabi, Israel's Fateful Hour (New York: Harper and
Row, 1988), pp. 213-214. Quoted in: Andrew J. Hurley, Israel and the New
World Order (Santa Barbara, Calif.: 1991), pp. 93, 208-209.; Avishai Margalit,
"The Violent Life of Yitzhak Shamir," New York Review of Books,
May 14, 1992, pp. 18-24.; Lenni Brenner, Zionism in the Age of the Dictators
(1983), pp. 266-269.; L. Brenner, Jews in America Today (1986), pp. 175-177.;
L. Brenner, "Yitzhak Shamir: On Hitler's Side," Arab Perspectives
(League of Arab States), March 1984, pp. 11-13. 49.Avishai Margalit, "The
Violent Life of Yitzhak Shamir," New York Review of Books, May 14,
1992, pp. 18-24.; Lenni Brenner, Zionism in the Age of the Dictators (1983),
pp. 266-269.; L. Brenner, Jews in America Today (1986), pp. 175-177.; L.
Brenner, "Skeletons in Shamir's Cupboard," Middle East International,
Sept. 30, 1983, pp. 15-16.; Sol Stern, L. Rapoport, "Israel's Man
of the Shadows," Village Voice (New York), July 3, 1984, pp. 13 ff.