PJ #48 " TANGLED WEBS VOL. V ", chapter 9 & 10.
By GYEORGOS CERES HATONN, transcribed by Christ.
Dec 12, 2010 - 12:00:00 AM
REC #1 HATONN
THU., APRIL 2, 1992 7:34 A.M. YEAR 5, DAY 230
THURSDAY, APRIL 2, 1992
THOUGHTS ABOUT "LIVING"
I am reminded that ALL thoughts are about "living" (not necessarily "life") and not about after "death". Perhaps it is time to integrate the two from the physical plane that you may have insight into that which is the glory awaiting. AHO.
The path of life unfolds according to the needs of the one in experience of this wondrous manifestation and it can be joyous or hell, depending upon attitudes and KNOWING.
You shall learn that even in your business, or labor, or condition of life, are but incidents, or the outer vehicles chosen and used to carry you through certain experiences which are deemed best adapted to bring you to the great realization of God within from whence comes all thy strength and all thine blessings.. At the same time it quickens in you certain Soul qualities that know but imperfectly "express".
If you can but KNOW God, dwelling thus in your being, accompanying you to your office, to your shop, to your labor, whatever it be, and will permit Him to direct your business and all your ways; verily I remind you, when you can do this, you will at once become conscious of a new Power within you, a Power that will grow and flow forth from you as a gentle, kindly sympathy, a true brotherliness, a loving helpfulness to all with whom you come in contact--but with the foundation of the rock upon which the power resides, inspiring them to higher principles of business and of life, creating in them a longing to shed a similar influence within their own circle; a Power that will attract TO you business, money, friends, and abundance of all things you need; A POWER THAT WILL CONNECT YOU WITH THE HIGHEST REALMS OF THOUGHT, ENABLING YOU BOTH TO VISION CLEARLY AND TO MANIFEST CONSCIOUSLY ALL GOD'S WONDROUS SHARED POWERS AND ATTRIBUTES EVERY MOMENT OF YOUR LIFE--HERE AND BEYOND INTO INFINITY. So shall it be.
In this manner you will no longer need to feed from another's opinions of doctrines for you will have come within that which is wondrous. You will no longer feel need to go to churches or religious meetings save for the social aspect of such gatherings (if there be any of worthy nature), or even to read the teachings of God's revelations, in order to find GOD and to dwell within GOD. May you always walk with God that your journey may be wondrous and your experience worthy. Salu.
That which we have been giving unto you is unfolding in the seeming reality of experience which is taking place around your beings. Everything from the lies attending Israel/U.S. arms to the buying off of the Soviets in blackmail.
But you have just begun this journey into Truth and the road will be strewn with dead bodies of ones who saw not. You shall need pass them by and move forward if you will turn about the insanity of the nations into a course toward balance and harmony among men.
BEWARE OF "TROJAN HORSES"
Dear ones, the reason you have opportunity to "buy" the Soviet advanced technology is because they no longer need it--their space technology has advanced beyond the need of nuclear thrust systems as you recognize them. In other words you are purchasing material which is obsolete and they laugh at you all the way to the bank. How much blackmail can you afford? Good luck!
DID YOU MISS THIS?
Save the children from Polio? Oh indeed, the presentation and great and wondrous "good" was showered upon you in the form of vaccinations, etc. Now what do I tell you? Oh no, Hatonn, you cry out. Oh yes, indeed, I must reply for the action against you was begun in the beginning of all "time" experience and through the ages one thing after another led unto this day.
You quarrel and take exception with me that most of your "immunizations" are "killer" immunizations. Here, therefore, is a good example: Researchers have found concrete evidence that polio vaccines used in the 1950's carried a virus that causes AIDS in monkeys. You can now check it out through a Robert Bohanon, a molecular virologist and president of a company developing AIDS test kits (if you find that more confirming), who has found that many stocks of polio vaccines used in major cities in the mid-1950's have tested positive for the virus in point.
Vaccine discoverers Jonas Salk and Albert Sabin confirm the shots administered to millions of people around the world WERE LATER FOUND TO BE CONTAMINATED WITH NUMEROUS "MONKEY" VIRUSES--INCLUDING THOSE WHICH CAUSE AIDS-LIKE DISEASES.
While you are hyping Jesse Jackson and his perfection as running mate for Brown--perhaps you'd better look again. I have warned you that he is high on the list of Council on Foreign Relations which is an integrated (into your government and business) worker for the Elite. Perhaps if I give perspective in the area of MONEY, you will be able to see and hear a bit more carefully.
$11,000 was paid for a Paris hotel bill for Jesse Jackson, his wife and a couple of other people--BY BCCI--after Jackson promised to lobby African central banks to redeposit their funds with BCCI. Nazir Chinoy, one head of BCCI's Paris branch, told a Senate subcommittee many African banks subsequently moved their funds.
ON THE SUBJECT OF BANKS
Please note that Bush never ceases to amaze everyone in his varied enterprises. When have you had enough to refuse to "take it any more"?
You seem to have great difficulty believing that I could be giving you Truth--"it is just too far-out". How about hearing it from a responsible Representative from Texas--on the Banking Committee? How about Henry Gonzales who has uncovered yet another Bush Administration scandal, this one involving the extraordinary lengths Bush went to in order to protect Iraqi interests in the United States, even when Iraq was violating U.S. law. The massive cover-up went right on while your American family members were at war with that country!
Oh indeed, I told you--I also told you that Bush and Saddam had shared over $250 BILLION in BCCI. I hope that you precious ones will go back and catch up on your reading homework for you will find that we have missed very little. Hard to take? You had best believe it! Hard indeed!! However, your very survival depends upon that which you do about these things--AND YOU CAN DO IT WITH BALLOTS AND DEMAND OF RETURN OF YOUR CONSTITUTION.
The U.S. Justice Department quashed an indictment back in 1989 and 1990 concerning a multi-billion-dollar bank fraud case involving the Atlanta branch of the state-controlled Italian (Mafia, remember) bank, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro. Yes, we just recently wrote about this bank in quite a lot of detail. The case included $500 million in U.S. loan "guarantees" to Iraq. Of course the loans are NEVER expected to be paid back--for this is the way you transfer money in those circles--just like bounced checks in the House bank. The Iraqis have, of course and as planned, defaulted on the loans, which have now fallen on the backs of U.S. taxpayers.
At the time, the Bush State Department squelched any federal prosecutors from filing charges against the Central Bank of Iraq, a key player in the cute little scam.
GONZALES: LONE VOICE IN THE WILDERNESS
It is now recognized, but not by you-the-people, that all the dealings were dead wrong and destructive in intent and practice. Good Gonzales has been placing all his findings into the Congressional Record (that is wherein a speaker gives his speech to a vacant House because no-one is interested in the material). He has entered documents and official correspondence and most House members haven't the slightest idea that it is even there. They are off covering assets and campaigning, you understand-- not representing you-the-people.
In late 1989 is revealed that once it had become clear that high-level Iraqis were involved in the $4 BILLION bank fraud, fed-eral investigators had tried to persuade the Agriculture and State Departments to deny guarantees of $500 million in loans to the Iraqi government, but to no avail. The loan guarantees were made under direct pressure from George Bush and his ad-ministration enforcers, freeing up Iraqi funds to exchange for sophisticated weaponry THAT U.S. TROOPS ULTIMATELY FACED DURING THE GULF CONFLICT WITH IRAQ--THEY DIDN'T EVEN SHARE ANY OF THAT SO YOU COULD PURCHASE THOSE NICE YELLOW RIBBONS TO BEDECK THE HALLS.
The Iraqis not only have defaulted but refused to even consider hearing about the matter--which I'm sure, makes more sense than paying up for the pleasure of being precision and/or surgically bombed into oblivion--but, of course, only civilians.
Funny things happened: At the time the warnings about the fraud were made known to the Agriculture and State Departments, the federal prosecutors wanted to bring charges against the Central Bank of Iraq for its involvement in the scam but were soundly rebuffed and ordered to cease and desist.
However, interestingly enough, the day after President Bush ordered a cease-fire in the war with Iraq, then-Attorney General Richard Thornburgh announced a 347-count (that is quite a few counts) indictment against the Iraqi officials involved in the scam and former executives of the Atlanta branch of Bank Lavoro, as it is more commonly known. There are just simply bunches of documents between this Bank in point and the Federal Reserve Bank and any investigators who got "close" were thwarted at every turn. Do you not find this interesting?
At the time the illegal banking scheme was under way, between 1985 and 1989, the Reagan and Bush Administrations were trying to build stronger ties with Iraq. Does anyone remember that phase of lies? After the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, the United States began assisting Iraq to rebuild its economy, in spite of warnings Iraq was using the aid to build up its war ma-chine. But of course it would have to be that way because you were also sending the weapons.
And what indictments finally came down? Charges that executives of the Atlanta branch defrauded the parent bank in Rome by arranging loans for Iraq without its knowledge. Some of those bank executives, who are also on the Elite list of good-kids, received hundreds of thousands of dollars in kickbacks from firms (also good-kids) seeking to do business with Iraq. This business, by the way, would have been quite impossible without the bank's huge infusion of cash. Where do you think the cash was coming from? I thought you might be beginning to see "connections" within the tangled webs. So be it.
The illegal we do immediately. The un‑
constitutional takes a little longer.
Dharma, before we move right off into our "Intelligence Cult" subject--let me share a moment with you as to confirmations and facts.
Rick has just come with a video tape rented from the local outlet. This movie in point is called EXECUTIVE ACTION, stars Burt Lancaster, Robert Ryan and Will Geer; an Edward Lewis Production, from Warner Brothers. It is a 1973 release so it is certainly not "new". And guess what! It is an outlay of things like the Kennedy assassination and also an expose' of such things as "the Plan" and the intention to reduce the world's population to 550 million people, etc., etc. For you who are having difficulty accepting all this "new" information, please avail yourselves of such material and it will give you more balance to understand the magnitude of the cover-ups and deceit. You could not know of these things for all evidence was carefully monitored in modes of transmission and you were not ready to "hear" in the midst of "good times". Be forgiving unto selves and set the past aside--it is through the actions of realization that impact shall be made--not flagellation of selves for past ignorance or non-attention as revelations occurred--THE TIME IS AT HAND--NOW, NOT "THEN".
Let us now return to the CIA:
BASIC AREAS OF AGENT RELATIONS
TESTING: Once an agent has been recruited, his case officer immediately tests his loyalty and reliability. He will be given certain tasks to carry out which, if successfully performed, will establish his sincerity and access to secret information. The agent may be asked, for example, to collect information on a subject about which, unknown to him, the agency has already acquired a great deal of knowledge. If his reporting does not jibe with the previous intelligence, he is likely to be either a double agent attempting to mislead his case officer or a poor source of information clumsily trying to please his new employer. When feasible, the agent's performance will be carefully monitored during the testing period through discreet surveillance.
In addition, the new agent will almost certainly be required to take a lie-detector test. CIA operators place heavy reliance on the findings of a polygraph machine--referred to as the "black box"--in their agent operations. Polygraph specialists are available from headquarters and several of the agency's regional support centers to administer the tests on special assignment. According to one such specialist, testing foreign agents calls for completely different skills than questioning Americans under consideration for career service with the CIA. He found Americans to be normally straightforward and relatively predictable in their responses to the testing, making it comparatively simple to isolate someone who is not up to the agency's standards. But testing foreign agents, he says, is much more difficult. Adjustments must be made to allow for cultural differences, and for the fact that the subject is engaging in clearly illegal and highly dangerous secret work. An ideologically motivated agent, furthermore, may be quite emotional and thus unusually difficult to "read", or evaluate, from the machine's measurements. One spying solely for monetary gain or to satisfy some private vice may be impossible to read because there is no way of gauging his moral limits. Congenital liars, psychopaths, and users of certain drugs can frequently "beat the black box". According to the polygraph expert, a decision on the agent's reliability and sincerity is, therefore, based as much on the intuition of the tester as on the measurements of the machine. The agent, however, is led to believe that the black box is infallible, so if he is neither a well-trained double agent nor clinically abnormal, he will more than likely tell the truth.
[H: Of course, in the above matter--the agent will later be trained to defeat all such devices beginning with lie-detector equipment; it is a requirement prior to "graduation".]
When training can be provided to an agent, he will be taught the use of any equipment he may need--a miniature camera for photographing documents, for example. He will be instructed in one of several methods of covert communications--secret writing, coded or encrypted radio transmission, or the like. He will also learn the use of clandestine contacts. And he will be given training in security precautions, such as the detection and avoidance of surveillance.
Depending upon the agent's availability, however, and his estimated worth in the eyes of the Clandestine Services, he may receive only a few short lessons from his case officer on how to use an audio device or how to communicate with the agency through a series of cut-outs. Or he may be asked to invent a cover story to give to his family and his employer that will allow him to spend several days or even a couple of weeks at an agency safe house, learning the art of espionage. He may even seek an excuse to leave the country so he can receive instruction at a CIA facility in another nation, where it is much less likely to be observed by his country's security service. Or he may even be monitored while here by the CIA Office of Security. Special training facilities for foreign recruits, isolated from all other activities, exist at Camp Peary--"The Farm"--in southern Virginia.
While the tradecraft taught to the agent is unquestionably useful, the instruction period also serves as an opportunity for his case officer and the other instructors to motivate him and increase his commitment to the CIA's cause. The agent is introduced to the clandestine proficiency and power of the agency. He sees its tightly knit professional camaraderie. He learns that although he is abandoning his former way of life, he now has a chance for a better one. Good work on his part will be rewarded with political asylum; the government he is rejecting may even be replaced by a superior one. Thus his allegiance to his new employer is further forged. It is the task of the case officer to maintain this attitude in the mind of his agent.
HANDLING: Successful handling of an agent hinges on the strength of the relationship that the case officer is able to establish with his agent. According to one former CIA operator, a good case officer must combine the qualities of a master spy, a psychiatrist, and a father confessor.
There are two prevailing views within the CIA's Clandestine Services on the best way to handle, or run, an agent. One is the "buddy" technique, in which the case officer develops a close personal relationship with his agent and convinces him that they are working together to attain an important political goal. This approach can provide a powerful motivating force, encouraging the agent to take great risks for his friend. Most senior operators believe, however, that the "buddy" technique leads to the danger of the case officer forming an emotional attachment to his agent, sometimes causing the CIA man to lose his professional objectivity. At the other end of the agent-handling spectrum is the "cynical" style, in which the operator, while feigning personal concern for the agent, actually deals with him in a completely callous manner--one that may border on ruthlessness. From the beginning, this case officer is interested only in results. He drives the agent to extremes in an attempt to achieve maximum operational performance. This method, too, has its drawbacks: once the agent senses he is merely being exploited by his case officer, his loyalty can quickly evaporate.
Agents are intricate and, often, delicately balanced individuals. The factors which lead them into the clandestine game are many and highly complex. The stresses and pressures under which they must function tend to make such men volatile, often unpredictable. The case officer, therefore, must continually be alert for any sign that his agent is unusually disturbed, that he may not be carrying out his mission. The operator must always employ the right mixture of flattery and threats, ideology and money, emotional attachment and ruthlessness to keep his agent actively working for him.
With the Soviet Oleg Penkovsky, his British and CIA handlers found that flattery was a particularly effective method of motivation. Although he preferred British manners, Penkovsky greatly admired American power. Accordingly, he was secretly granted U.S. citizenship and presented with his "secret" CIA medal. [H: How many of you-the-people could swing such a thing? Does this truly sound like the "America" you once knew and loved and served?] As a military man, he was quite conscious of rank; consequently, he was made a colonel in the U.S. Army to show him that he suffered no loss of status because of his shift in allegiance.
On two occasions while Penkovsky was an active spy, he traveled outside the U.S.S.R. on official duty with high-level delegations attending Soviet-sponsored trade shows. Both times, first in London and then in Paris, he slipped away from his Soviet colleagues for debriefing and training sessions with British and American case officers. During one of the London meetings, he asked to see his U.S. Army uniform. None of the CIA men, nor any of the British operators, had anticipated such a request. One quick thinking officer, however, announced that the uniform was at another safe house and that driving there and bringing it back for Penkovsky to see would take a while. The spy was temporarily placated, and a CIA case officer was immediately dispatched to find a colonel's uniform to show to the agent. After scurrying around London for a couple of hours in search of an American Army colonel with a build similar to Penkovsky's, the operator returned triumphantly to the debriefing session just as it was concluding--uniform in hand, Penkovsky was pleased.
[H: Do you think all of this is too preposterous to believe?? The next time you confront an army personnel--consider whether or not he might be who he says he is. Also, as you travel along the roadways--LOOK at the trucks. Do you actually KNOW what is within, say, a Piggly Wiggly trailer? How about what is within a "toxic" labeled truck--how about those tightly wrapped, funny shaped loads on flat-beds? DO YOU KNOW WHAT IS WITHIN?? OF COURSE NOT. Do you know what is aboard a train tanker car? How about an enclosed Sea-Land "ocean" carrier?? Would you recognize a missile if you saw one? Would you recognize anything broken into component parts--even your automobile or refrigerator, much less components for an atomic fueled stealth craft of some kind? You must begin to give thought to these things for THIS IS HOW they have fooled you--BY THE OBVIOUS!)
Months later, in Paris, the CIA operators were better prepared. A brand-new uniform tailored to Penkovsky's measurements was hung in a closet in a room adjacent to where he was being debriefed, and he inspected it happily when the meeting was concluded.
In the 1950's the CIA recruited an Eastern European intelligence officer in Vienna whose motivation, like Penkovsky's, was essentially ideological. While he was promised a good salary (and a comfortable pension upon the completion of the operation, at which time he would formally defect to the United States), his case officer avoided making any direct payments to him in Vienna in order not to risk attracting the opposition's attention to him. The agent well understood the need for such precautions, yet after he had been spying for a while, he shocked his case officer one day by demanding a fairly substantial amount of cash. He refused to say why he wanted the money, but it was obvious to his case officer that the agent's continued good work for the agency was contingent on getting the money he had requested. After consultations with the local CIA station chief and with headquarters, it was finally decided that the risk must be taken and the agent was given the money, with the hope that he would not do something outlandish or risky with it. Agency operators then put him under surveillance to learn what he was up to. To their consternation, they discovered him the following weekend on the Danube River cruising back and forth in a motorboat which he had just bought. A few days afterward his case officer confronted him and demanded that he get rid of the boat for it was not something a man of his ostensibly austere circumstances could possibly have purchased on his own salary. The agent agreed, casually explaining that ever since he was a small boy he had wanted to own a motorboat. Now that yearning was out of his system and he was quite willing to give up the boat.
Another Eastern European, who spied briefly for the CIA years later, refused all offers of pensions and political asylum in the West. He wanted only Benny Goodman records.
BLACKMAIL HOVERS ALWAYS
One of the problems in handling an agent is caused by the changeover of case officers. In keeping with the CIA's policy of employing diplomatic and other forms of official cover for most of its operators serving abroad, case officers masquerading as U.S. diplomats, AID officials, Department of Defense representatives, and the like, must be transferred every two to four years to another foreign country or to Washington for a head-quarters assignment, as is customary with genuine American officials. A departing case officer introduces his replacement to all his agents before he leaves, but often the agents are initially reluctant to deal with a new man. Having developed an accept-able working relationship with one case officer, they usually are not eager to change to another. Their reluctance is often heightened by the agency's practice of assigning young case officers to handle already proven agents. In this way, junior operators can gain experience with agents who, as a rule, do not need as much professional guidance or sympathetic "hand-holding" as newly recruited ones. Most agents, however, feel that dealing with an inexperienced officer only increases the risks of compromise. All in all, making the changeover can be quite sticky, but it is almost always accomplished without permanent damage to the operation. If persuasion and promises are not adequate to retain the agent's loyalty, threats of blackmail usually are. The agency precaution of amassing incriminating evidence--secret contracts, signed payment receipts, tape recordings, and photographs-- generally will convince even the most reluctant agent to see things the CIA's way.
In certain highly sensitive operations the problem of case-officer changeover is avoided in deference to the wishes of a particularly highly placed agent. The potential damage to the operator's cover by his prolonged service in a given country is considered of less importance than the maintenance of the delicate relationship he has developed with the agent. Similarly, in those situations where a
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the agency officer may serve as many as six or eight years on the operation before being replaced. And when he is eventually transferred to another post, great care is taken to select a re-placement who will be acceptable to the friendly chief of state.
TERMINATION: All clandestine operations ultimately come to an end. Those dependent upon agent activities have a short life expectancy and often conclude suddenly. The agent may die of natural causes or by accident--or he may be arrested and imprisoned, even executed. In any such event, the sole consideration of the CIA operators on the scene is to protect the agency's interests, usually by covering up the fact that the individual was a secret agent of the U.S. government. Sometimes, however, the agency itself must terminate the operation and dispose of the agent. The decision to terminate is made by the CIA chief of station in the country where the operation is in progress, with the approval of agency headquarters. The reason for breaking with an agent may be simply his loss of access to the secrets that the CIA is interested in acquiring; more complicated is emotional instability, lack of personal trustworthiness endangering the operation, or threat of imminent exposure and arrest. Worst of all, there may be a question of political unreliability--it may be suspected that the man is, or has become, a double agent, provocation, or deception controlled by an opposition intelligence service.
The useless or unstable agent can usually be bought off or, if necessary, successfully threatened. A reliable or useful agent in danger of compromise or exposure to the opposition, or an agent who has fulfilled his agreement as a spy and has performed well, can be resettled in another country, provided with the necessary funds, even assisted in finding employment or, at least, retrained for a new profession. In those cases where the agent has contributed an outstanding service to the CIA at great personal risk, particularly if he burned himself out in so doing, he will be brought to the United States for safe resettlement. The Director of Central Intelligence, under the CIA Act of 1949, can authorize the "entry of a particular alien into the United States for permanent residence....in the interest of national security or the furtherance of the national intelligence mission." The agent and his family can be granted "permanent residence without regard to their inadmissibility under the immigration or any other laws and regulations."
FRIENDLY NATIONS IMPLANTED
Resettlement, however, does not always go smoothly. And sometimes this is the fault of the CIA. In the late 1950's, when espionage was still a big business in Germany, former agents and defectors were routinely resettled in Canada and Latin America. The constant flow of anti-communist refugees to those areas was too much for the agency's Clandestine Services to resist. From time to time, an active agent would be inserted into the resettlement process. But the entire operation almost collapsed when, within a matter of months, both Canadian and Brazilian governments discovered that the CIA was using it as a means to plant operating agents in their societies.
Not all former agents are willing to be resettled in the United States, especially not on the CIA's terms. In the 1960's a high-ranking Latin American official who had been an agent for years was forced for internal political reasons to flee his native country. He managed to reach Mexico City, where agency operators again made contact with him. In consideration of his past services, the agency was willing to arrange for his immigration to the U.S. under the 1949 CIA law if he would sign an agreement to remain quiet about his secret connection with the U.S. government and not become involved in exile political activities in this country. The Latin American, who had ambitions to return triumphantly to his native country one day, refused to forgo his right to plot against his enemies back home, and wanted residence in the United States without citizenship, thus presenting the CIA with a difficult dilemma. As long as the former agent remained unhappy and frustrated in Mexico City, he represented a threat that his relationship with the agency and those of the many other CIA penetrations of his government which he knew about might be exposed. As a result, CIA headquarters in Langley sent word to the station in Mexico City that the ex-agent could enter the country without the usual preconditions. The agency's top officials hoped that he could be kept under reasonable control and prevented from getting too deeply involved in political activities which would be particularly embarrassing to the U.S. government.
It is only logical to believe that there are instances when termination requires drastic action on the part of the operators. Such cases are, of course, highly sensitive and quite uncommon in the CIA. But when it does become necessary to consider the permanent elimination of a particularly threatful agent [H: Such as Casey who was head of the CIA and could spill all the beans to Congress and you-the-people and who immediately came down with terminal, inoperable cancer of the brain which of course killed him in a matter of days.], the final decision must be made at the highest level of authority [H: Such as the President and Vice President (Bush) at the time.], by the Director of Central Intelligence. [H: You see, I believe you will agree that it probably was not Casey who decided it was time to meet his maker and therefore there would be only those higher authorities available and thus, you can know WHO ordered the murder.] With the exception of special or paramilitary operations, physical violence and homicide are not viewed as acceptable clandestine methods--unless they are acceptable to the Director himself.
* * *
There is too much here to absorb, Dharma, so allow us to take a break from the writing and allow ones to settle their own thoughts.
May insight into Truth be your guideline and shield. Salu.
Hatonn to clear, please.
REC #2 HATONN
THU., APRIL 2, 1992 2:27 P.M. YEAR 5, DAY 230
THURSDAY, APRIL 2, 1992
NOTATION FOR READERS
This is a brief update and request for you who are now aware of a second resource for information: THE WORD. This is a designation so that the requests for audio information goes directly to its source of "creation". There are two good reasons for this--one is that it goes directly for handling to a separate area immediately. Within a few days the post office box will also change and therefore I ask that you please be patient while all the rearrangements are being finalized here.
I would, further, ask that all material sent which is desired for my attention be sent henceforth to "THE WORD" as it will come directly to the "horse's nose". If you send orders for America West it is fine if they are included so as to save postage and we will make sure they are sorted accordingly. I appreciate your cooperation as it was becoming too much of burden for the small staff at America West to handle all the load. The volunteers who send the paper are our salvation for there is no way we could do the work without their unwavering labor, and do believe me, it is offered with such love and hopes.
The second reason for this change is that the book inventory is being shifted and a lot of mailing will be coming out of Nevada and I do not yet know of finalized addresses, phones, etc. This bit of separation will relieve the office crew greatly during this changeover and all orders which may be combined can be sorted and sent to proper locations.
We have been most grateful to the Greens for their support and taking of this massive burden and we wish to work in any way possible to make your service faster and their load a bit lighter. I am asking Dalene to basically take charge of the taping, etc., and Cort has set up a good, sound record keeping system and all have pitched in to make it as efficient as possible. Change is always difficult and unwieldy but I believe it can run quite smoothly as I shove off in increasing the information flow--the only way we can do it is to allow for audio tapes for we have about run out of Dharma's ability to increase in typing speed.
If we err, please be gentle as our workers are so few and the load so tremendous. Thank you.
TWO MORE BOOKS
There will be two volumes coming forth from America West in the near future which I wish to call into your attention to watch for because we have a tendency to allow slippage during great changover. Dr. Coleman is working on an outlay of the Foundations, etc., and I have no title for that as of yet, so I assume we are some weeks away from printing. However, the "300" book has been in such demand that it has brought notice of the "surveillance groups", so we are being sure we don't stub our toes.
I ask that you ones understand that when I "push" a book, it is with great thought to the overall picture--not necessarily a blessing upon the belief system or projections of the author in point. This same assumption must work in reverse because some who bring truth in much of their work may well not agree with my discipline. My knowledge, however, is that before we are done and the play finished--they will!
Also being printed very soon is a volume from Esu through Little Dru and, as always, it is wondrous--it will lay out the course of God quite bluntly, succinctly and with such love that you shall be overjoyed and uplifted in the very reading. We will let you know as soon as either are available. You are all much like Dharma--sometimes even God is not enough and you want to hear it from the gentle "lamb" of radiance come into His perfection. Ah, 'tis the joy and "pride" of a father that I witness His growth in wisdom unto perfection. How wondrous for you ones who experience at this time that you might share in the moment of these great events. Will it not be wondrous when the circle is closed and is no more broken? Man longs for the "whole" and so shall it come to pass in your time upon the place of Creation as gifted unto you as a species and a civilization.
Let us now return to the subject in point for it seems so much information piles up that we shall never make it through and into the glories awaiting.
Two aspects of clandestine tradecraft which have particular applicability to classical espionage, and to agent operations in general, are secret communications and contacts. The case officer must set up safe means of communicating with his agent; otherwise, there will be no way of receiving the information that the agent is stealing, or of providing him with instructions and guidance. In addition to a primary communication system, there will usually be an alternate method for use if the primary system fails. From time to time, different systems will be employed to reduce the chances of compromising the operation. As with most activities in the intelligence game, there are no hard and fast rules governing communication with secret agents. As long as the methods used are secure and workable, the case officer is free to devise any means of contact with his agent that is suitable to the operational situation.
Many agents want to pass on their information verbally to the case officer. From their point of view, it is both safer and easier than dealing with official papers or using spy equipment, either of which could clearly incriminate them if discovered by the local authorities. The CIA, however, prefers documents. Documents can be verified, thus establishing the agent's reliability. They can be studied and analyzed in greater detail and with more accuracy by the intelligence experts at headquarters. In the Penkovsky case, for example, the secret Soviet documents he provided were far more valuable than his personal interpretations of events then occurring in Moscow's military circles.
On the other hand, some agents want to have as little personal contact as possible with their case officers. Each clandestine meeting is viewed as an invitation to exposure and imprisonment, or worse. Such agents would prefer to communicate almost exclusively through indirect methods or even by mechanical means (encoded or encrypted radio messages, invisible ink, micro-dots, and so on). But the CIA insists on its case officers having personal contact with their agents, except in exceptionally risky cases. Periodically, the spy's sincerity and level of motivation must be evaluated in face to face meetings with the operator.
CUT-OUT: A USEFUL CONDUIT
Each time the case officer has a personal contact with his agent, there is the danger that the two will be observed by the local security forces, or by a hostile service such as the KGB. To minimize the risk of compromise, indirect methods of contact are employed most of the time, especially for the passing of information from the agent to the operator. One standard technique is the use of a "cut-out", an intermediary who serves as a go-between. The cut-out may be witting or unwitting; he may be another agent; he may even reside in another country. Regardless, his role is to receive material from either the agent or the case officer and then relay it to the other, without being aware of its substance.
Another technique is the dead-drop, or dead-letter drop. This is a kind of secret post-office box such as a hollow tree, the underside of a park bench, a crevice in an old stone wall [H: Even a phone booth with a brown paper sack.]--any natural and unlikely repository that can be utilized for transferring materials. (One of the dead-drops used in the Penkovsky operation was the space behind the steam-heat radiator in the entry of an apartment building in Moscow.) The agent simply deposits his material in the dead-drop at a prearranged time; later it is "serviced" by the case officer or a cut-out engaged for this single purpose.
Still another frequently used technique is that of the brush contact, in which the agent and his case officer or a cut-out meet in passing at some prearranged public place. The agent may en-counter his contact, for example, on a crowded subway platform, in a theater lobby, or perhaps the two will manage to get close together for a moment, long enough for one to slip some-thing into the other's hand or pocket. Or they may quickly ex-change newspapers or briefcases. Such a contact is extremely brief as well as surreptitious, and usually it is quite secure if well executed.
Although the case officer makes frequent use of indirect contacts, he still must arrange personal meetings with his agent from time to time. Whenever there is a clandestine meeting--on a bus, in a park, at a restaurant--other CIA operators keep watch as a precaution against opposition monitoring or interference. This is known in the covert business as countersurveillance. The case officer works out safe and danger signals in advance of each rendezvous with both the agent and the countersurveillance team. In this way, the operator, the agent, or any member of the team can signal to the others to proceed with the meeting or to avoid or break off contact if something seems out of the ordinary. Safe houses (CIA-maintained residences) are also used for meetings with agents, especially if there is a lot to be discussed. A safe house has the advantage of providing an atmosphere where the agent and the case officer can relax and talk freely without fear of surveillance, but the more frequently one location is used, the more likely it is to be discovered by the opposition. The need for secrecy can keep the clandestine operator busy, but it is a need on which the clandestine operator thrives.
[H: a favored place for shifting documents is at the copy machine and this is how, for instance, SILENT WEAPONS FOR QUIET WARS came into the hands of we-the-people. The document had been "dropped" in the copy machine but something interrupted the receiver from recovering it. So when the old equipment was updated--out went the secret document (baby) with the "bathwater". It happens more often than you think.]
A few years ago [remember, this was first written in 1974] Newsweek magazine described the CIA as the most secretive and tightly knit organization (with the possible exception of the Mafia) in American society. The characterization is something of an overstatement, but it contains more than a kernel of truth. In its golden era, during the height of the Cold War, the agency did possess a rare elan; it had a staff of imaginative and daring officers at all levels and in all directorates. But over the years the CIA has grown old, fat, and bureaucratic. The esprit de corps and devotion to duty its staff once had, setting the agency apart from other government departments, has faded, and to a great degree it has been replaced by an outmoded, doctrinaire approach to its missions and functions. The true purpose of secrecy--to keep the opposition in the dark about agency policies and operations--has been lost sight of. Today the CIA often practices secrecy for secrecy's sake [H: And to never have to answer for any of their actions. In other words--total non-accountability.]--and to prevent the American public from learning of its activities. And the true purpose of intelligence collection--to monitor efficiently the threatening moves of inter-national adversaries--has been distorted by the need to nourish a collective clandestine ego.
[H: Please, "we-the-people", do not think the CIA files are being opened on the various scandals because you want to see within--the KGB is releasing files regarding your secret files and the you-know- what has hit the fan. The files had to be squared away and reproduced and tampered to allow bringing forth to counter the truth which the KGB intends to dump on you. Actually, they are "selling" the files to the highest bidders and guess who that will be in every instance! Moreover, it is exactly as with the obsolete thrust systems and other "advanced" technology you will buy--worthless and bringing a very high ransom price.]
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INTERNAL PROTEST HIDDEN
After the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in 1970, a few hundred CIA employees (mostly younger officers from the Intelligence and Science and Technology directorates, not the Clandestine Services) signed a petition objecting to American policies in Indochina. Director Richard Helms was so concerned about the prospect of widespread unrest in the agency's ranks and the chance that word of it might leak out to the public that he summoned all the protesters to the main auditorium and lectured them on the need to separate their personal views from their professional duties. At the same time, similar demonstrations on the Cambodian issue were mounted at the State Department and other government agencies. Nearly every newspaper in the country carried articles about the incipient rebellion brewing in the ranks of the federal bureaucracy. The happenings at the CIA, which were potentially the most newsworthy of all, were, however, never discovered by the press. In keeping with the agency's clandestine traditions, CIA employees had conducted a secret protest.
To agency personnel who had had the need for secrecy drilled into them from their moment of recruitment, there was nothing strange about keeping their demonstration hidden from public view. Secrecy is an absolute way of life at the agency and, while outsiders might consider some of the resulting practices comical in the extreme, the subject is treated with great seriousness in the CIA. Training officers lecture new personnel for hours on end about "security consciousness", and these sessions are augmented during an employee's entire career by refresher courses, warning posters, and even the semi-annual requirement for each employee to review the agency's security rules and to sign a copy, as an indication it has been read. As a matter of course, outsiders should be told absolutely nothing about the CIA and fellow employees should be given only that information for which they have an actual "need to know". The penchant for secrecy sometimes takes on an air of ludicrousness. Secret medals are awarded for outstanding performance, but they cannot be worn or shown outside the agency. Even athletic trophies--for intramural bowling, softball and so on--cannot be displayed except when in the guarded sanctuary of the headquarters building. [H: Most of you will remember just recently that Oliver North made quite a tearful fuss over honoring those ones who could only be recognized in the secret places.]
CIA personnel become so accustomed to the rigorous security precautions (some of which are indeed justified) that they easily accept them all, and seldom are caught in violations. Nothing could be more natural than to work with a telephone book marked SECRET, an intentionally incomplete telephone book which lists no one working in the Clandestine Services and which in each semi-annually revised edition leaves out the names of many of the people employed by the overt directorates, so if the book ever falls into unauthorized hands, no enterprising foreign agent or reporter will be able to figure out how many people work at CIA headquarters, or even how many work in non-clandestine jobs. Those temporarily omitted can look forward to having their names appear in the next edition of the directory, at which time others are selected for telephonic limbo. Added to this confusion is the fact that most agency phone numbers are regularly changed for security reasons. Most employees manage to keep track of commonly called numbers by listing them in their own personal desk directories, although they have to be careful to lock these in their safes at night--or else risk being charged with a security violation. For a first violation the employee is given a reprimand and usually assigned to several weeks of security inspection in his or her office. Successive violations lead to forced vacation without pay for periods up to several weeks, or to outright dismissal.
SPIES SPY ON SPIES
Along with the phone books, all other classified material (including typewriter ribbons and scrap paper) is placed in these safes whenever an office is unoccupied. Security guards patrol every part of the agency at roughly half-hour intervals in the evening and on weekends to see that no secret documents have been left out, that no safes have been left unlocked, and that no spies are lurking in the halls. If a guard finds any classified material unsecured, both the person who failed to put it away and the person within the office who was assigned to double-check the premises have security violations entered in their personnel files.
These security precautions all take place inside a headquarters building that is surrounded by a twelve-foot fence topped with barbed wire, patrolled by armed guards and police dogs, and sealed off by a security check system that guarantees that no one can enter either the outer perimeter or the building itself without showing proper identification. Each CIA employee is issued a laminated plastic badge with his picture on it, and these must not only be presented to the guards on entry, but be kept constantly in view within the building. Around the edges of the badge are twenty or so little boxes which may or may not be filled with red letters. Each letter signifies a special security clearance held by the owner. Certain offices at the CIA are designated as restricted, and only persons holding the proper clearance, as marked on their badges, can gain entry. These areas are usually guarded by an agency policeman sitting inside a glass cage, from which he controls a turnstile that forbids passage to unauthorized personnel. Particularly sensitive offices are protected, in addition to the guarded turnstile, by a combination or cipher lock which must be opened by the individual after the badge is inspected.
Even a charwoman at the CIA must gain security clearance in order to qualify for the badge that she, too, must wear at all times; then she must be accompanied by an armed guard while she cleans offices (where all classified material has presumably already been locked up). Some rooms at the agency are considered so secret that the charwoman and her guard must also be watched by someone who works in the office.
The pervasive secrecy extends everywhere. Cards placed on agency bulletin boards offering items for sale conclude; "Call Bill, extension 6464". Neither clandestine nor overt CIA employees are permitted to have their last names exposed to the scrutiny of their colleagues, and it was only in 1973 that employees were allowed to answer their phones in any words other than those signifying the four-digit extension number.
Also until recent years all CIA personnel were required to identify themselves to non-agency people as employees of the State or Defense Department or some other outside organization. Now the analysis and technicians are permitted to say they work for the agency, although they cannot reveal their particular office. Clandestine Service employees are easily spotted around Washington because they almost always claim to be employed by Defense or State, but usually are extremely vague on the details and unable to furnish an office address. They do sometimes give out a phone number which corresponds to the correct exchange for their cover organization, but these extensions, through some deft wiring, ring in Langley. [H: Sounds like this computer--it just sort of prints out in about three covert places. My only objection to the arrangement is that when blocks of work get wiped out on this computer--they don't share with us and we have to rewrite. We have absolutely no bone to pick with anyone. We are here to bring the WORD OF GOD unto HIS PEOPLE. To get them to hear, we have to do all this tedious work and it frankly annoys me.]
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Dharma, allow us to close this chapter at this point for I ask that the first of the document be prepared in such manner as to go into the current LIBERATOR.
Fortunate are the people whose roots are deep in the foundation of God's Light. But how often do you neglect your own roots? Do you nourish them so they in turn can fill you with confidence when your need is there for strength? To tend of thine roots you must come into knowledge of self and herein lies the most elusive knowledge of all--self-knowledge. Would you take a while to linger with me and be deliberate in listening to self and being gentle with self--gentle in the uplifting from thine backsides and into action? Be compassionate and loving unto self for you are all injured and the tears are near as the insult upon your senses are laying bare your souls. If the tears come--let them water your soul and bathe it in the love of non-pretense. Tears heal--and oh, chelas, the wounded are everywhere. But always be in the remembering: Pain is inevitable--SUFFERING IS OPTIONAL. SALU.
Hatonn to clear, thank you.
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